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Deepening our understanding of the Swiss historical experience and of the evol-
ution of the local institutional context is one of the motivations for the applied
econometric work presented here. This is, however, not necessarily the most im-
portant justification to study a seemingly disparate set of historical topics ranging
from the heritage of French civil law in the 19th century, over the analysis of a
xenophobic event and its repercussions for the two universities in Zurich at the
end of the 19th century, to the long run effect of hunting regulation on game
populations in the 20th century. The main ambition for conducting such a thesis
was to combine unique Swiss data sets with empirical strategies of modern eco-
nometrics to make contributions to research questions of ongoing interest inside
and outside of academia.
Taking a closer look at the three projects, some unifying elements can be
highlighted: each of the three projects studies medium and long run effects of
institutional changes or events that are notoriously hard to examine. Often the
time dimension alone, e.g. studying phenomena that manifest over several dec-
ades, makes it virtually impossible to study such topics with experimental or
more recent data. Moreover, other dimensions, like cross-sectional scope, ethical
concerns or costliness preclude the application of experimental methods in some
cases. These complications justify the choice to go back in history for data and,
hopefully, some answers. Another unifying element is given by the use of Swiss
data sources. This has been a pragmatic choice: the macro-political stability and
territorial integrity of Switzerland combined with its diversity in institutional and
1
cultural dimensions and the finely grained administrative units provides rich data
sets to be used for empirical work in economic history. The availability and access
to such data is a comparative advantage of doing applied econometric work in
this field at a Swiss university and justifies to choose research topics accordingly.
Finally, each of the three projects aims to estimate effects that can be attributed to
a difference in institutions (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) or an event (Chapter 3).
All these projects, can be framed as Natural Experiments of History1, that is,
they exploit historical contingencies that feature an institutional change or a sud-
den political event which affects a part of the sample that can be compared to
unaffected observations serving as a control group: a “controlled comparison”
between “systems that are similar in many respects but that differ with respect to
the factors whose influence one wishes to study” (Diamond and Robinson, 2010,
p. 2). Of course, these historical events were most frequently not intended to be
conducted as an experiment. Therefore, the extent to which the treatment was
administered randomly has to be subjected to scrutiny and usually the treatment
will not turn out to be as clearly random, as it would be in a designed experiment.
This is a potentially significant weakness of the approach and a reason, why the
method is mainly applied to shed light on topics which are hard to study in other
ways, such as the topics at hand in this thesis:
Chapter 2 adds to a recent line of research on the long run effects of French re-
forms in occupied Europe during the 19th century. This research revolves around
a contribution by Acemoğlu et al. (2011). Applying an instrumental variables (IV)
approach, they show that the treatment of French institutional reform had a pos-
itive impact on economic development in the French-occupied part of Germany
over a period of almost 100 years.
One contribution of this chapter lies in demonstrating, that the mechanism
identified by Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and the claims of its generalisability pass a test
of external validity in the Swiss context. The Swiss data set includes population
data that goes back to 1798/1800 and measures the long run effects on economic
outcomes using data from the end of the 19th Century. In the case of the German
1Refer to Diamond and Robinson (2010) for other examples and a more thorough introduction
of the terminology.
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data it is hard to disentangle the effect of extremely favorable geographical factors
for the treated, that became extraordinarily beneficial during industrialisation
(like coal and natural infrastructure), from the effect of institutions. The controlled
comparison is between the annexed districts, which were endowed with French
institutions, but returned to Switzerland after the Napoléonic era, and those that
remained Swiss throughout.
Therefore, finding that geographically much less favored regions in Switzer-
land profited from French annexation is a striking and important result. Further-
more, this paper explores the respective contributions of institutional reforms at
the level of private law as well as at the level of federal reorganization2.
Chapter 3 adds to our understanding of how xenophobic events have affected
expatriates living and working in Switzerland in the relatively distant past of
the 19th Century. This research interest is related to current developments: in
February 2014 the Swiss voted for a revision of the emigration policy from the EU
to Switzerland. Although the details of implementation are not yet clear, the vote
demands curbing immigration, which led to irritation among foreigners already
working in Switzerland, for example, at the universities. In the aftermath of the
vote, questions were raised how such an event could impact Swiss society in the
next few years.
The medium and long term effects of this event remain to be observed and
examined as history unfolds in the years to come. However, we can also go back
in history to study the historical experience of Switzerland with large diasporas
of foreigners in the past and how they reacted towards events in Switzerland,
which they perceived as xenophobic at the time. We analyse an episode of Swiss
history when two fledgling universities (University of Zurich (UZH) and the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)) were heavily relying on foreign faculty,
mostly from Germany. In 1871 the Germans living in Zurich were shocked by the
Tonhalle Krawall, when a violent mob stormed the festivities by German expatriates
after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. Immediately this led to further
unrest, violent clashes and to an exodus of German expatriates from Switzerland.
2Granting status as independent cantons and full members to regions previously dominated
under the Ancien Régime.
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The controlled comparison, in this case, is of comparing observations immediately
before and after the treatment of the political event.
The Tonhalle Riots, for example, had a direct effect on the retention of faculty
members and on the recruitment at the two universities in Zurich in subsequent
years. Applying a proportional hazards model to a data set containing all full
professors employed in Zurich from 1833-1913 the study sheds light on the Swiss
historical experience with the dependence on foreign labor in the context of two
universities in Zurich and explores the repercussions of a xenophobic event in the
19th century using qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Chapter 4 studies the differential effect of two different institutions of renew-
able resource management in the context of hunting in 20th century Switzerland.
This study relates to the question of how to manage open-access resources that
are prone to over-exploitation. In the literature, this phenomenon has been called
the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). How can this topic be examined in
the historical and institutional context of hunting in Switzerland? Swiss hunting
regulations are marked by a pronounced dichotomy between the license-based
regime (LBR) and the district-based regime (DBR). This is unusual in international
comparison for such a small state and reflects the political independence of Swiss
cantons.
The LBR is more of an open-access regime where hunting is free for all licensed
hunters all across the canton and the DBR assigns private property rights to small
groups of hunters over many years for a given district. The available Swiss
data covers hunting statistics from 1933 to 2007. Two cantons (Luzern and St.
Gallen) switch from the LBR to the DBR in the period of observation. Their
development after treatment is compared to the control group, e.g. neighboring
cantons. The institutional diversity for comparable habitat in close geographical
proximity within the same framework of national legislation makes this data set
salient in international comparison, because typically the observations are drawn
from much more diverse backgrounds, and it is, therefore, particularly amenable
for a quantitative analysis of the two types of institutions. Using the number
of harvested animals as a proxy for long run population dynamics, this chapter
presents an estimate of the long run effect of switching from the LBR to the DBR
4
in the case of Roe Deer.
The estimates confirm the prediction of higher stocks of game animals under
the DBR based on institutional economics and the theory on renewable resources
(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2012, p. 329). This class of problem is relatively widely
studied for open-access fisheries and this paper adds to this literature. Under-
taking such a study for game animals in the hunting context with the toolbox of
modern panel data econometrics and estimating the functional form of the treat-
ment effect of the common-property institution over time, are - to the best of my
knowledge - novel contributions of this project.
5
Chapter 2
Long Run Effect of French
Annexation on 19th Century
Switzerland
2.1 Introduction
The economic literature on institutions and growth frequently and prominently
argues that institutions matter for economic outcomes in the long run.1 Nunn
(2009) identifies institutions as a key determinant of economic outcomes in his
survey of the empirical economic history literature. But, the author also emphas-
izes that institutional quality is only one factor besides culture, technology and
geography. Moreover, Nunn observes, that the exact channels of causality are still
poorly understood. Deaton (2010) makes the same point in his methodological
survey article on instrumental variables (IV) and randomization in the context of
development studies.
Nunn (2009) and Deaton (2010) both argue that we need to identify causal
mechanisms that are generalisable. That is generalisable to different social, na-
tional and historical contexts. Acemoğlu et al. (2011) have proposed a research
design, which they claim illustrates mechanisms for the Napoléonic era.2 Working
with German data, the authors have exploited the French-imposed institutional
variations in order to estimate the causal effect of institutional reform on economic
outcomes.
1See for example North and Thomas (1973) or Acemoğlu et al. (2001).
2In an earlier version of their 2011 contribution, they had included Switzerland as an observa-
tion for comparisons at the national level all over Western Europe (Acemoğlu et al., 2009).
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Specifically, they use the number of years of French administrative control as
an instrument for the effect of institutions on economic outcomes. The quality of
institutions is measured by a reform index consisting of a weighted average of
the number of years a civil code has beem in effect, serfdom has been abolished,
agrarian reforms have taken place and guilds have been abolished. Economic
outcomes are measured by the urbanization rate and the share of industrial work-
ers in the workforce. Their data is on district (n = 64) and province level (n ≤ 19)
with treated entities regionally concentrated on the left bank, of the Rhine and in
Northwestern Germany. They find a positive effect of early institutional reform
on economic outcomes.
At the time, the contemporary 19th century historian Friedrich Engels ob-
served, that the French treatment brought not only good instititutions to Germany,
but that the treatment was concentrated in a region characterized by natural re-
source abundance, access to the Rhine river and North Sea ports (Engels and
Marx, 1960, p. 115-117)3. These observations by a contemporary analyst support
the view, that French institutions have greatly benefited the treated regions in
Germany. They also raise concern over geographic factors that might drive the
results.
Of course, Acemoğlu et al. (2011) address this concern. The authors control,
for example, for the presence of coal by dropping the coal producing county
of Mark from the sample. This, however, may be insufficient, as the natural
infrastructure of the Rhine and its tributaries makes coal readily available in
virtually all annexed German territories. Moreover, they include panel data
estimation techniques to rule out that geographic factors contribute to the effect
they identify as being caused by institutions. A skeptic could hold that if the
geographic factors - of coal being available at its source, as well as along the Rhine
river and its tributaries - have a time-varying4 effect on economic development,
3Refer to the Appendix for the full quotation. Note, how Engels emphasizes both the institu-
tional and the geographical component in the economic development of the Rhineland. Moreover,
he observed that the interaction, of both institutional and geographical factors, led to the salient
economic and social development of the region.
4This is conceivable: coal became a much more valuable resource with the innovations of the
industrial revolution than it was before. While the presence of coal is constant, its value is not.
Neither is the degree of its exploitation (i.e. the seemingly constant geographical effect becomes
time-varying in its effect on economic outcomes).
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the geographical component driving the economic development of the German
treatment region would become much harder to control for, even with panel data
methods.
One contribution of this paper is to perform a test of external validity of this
study with the Swiss data at hand5. If it fails to identify similar effects in the
Swiss context, where like in the German case, many regions were forced to adopt
French institutions, this would be an important caveat against overemphasizing
the results from the research on Germany. If, however, the Swiss data - which
is characterized by a treatment region favoured much less by such obvious geo-
graphical factors - yields similar findings as Acemoğlu et al. (2011), their claim of
having identified a generalisable mechanism would gain credibility.
According to Nunn (2009), the research frontier has moved to unbundling
institutions. A corresponding question that could be asked (and answered) in the
Swiss context, concerns the respective contributions of the Codification6 of private
law and reforms at the Swiss federal level, which brought autonomy to formerly
subjugated regions (Untertanengebiete or subject districts7) in the Napoléonic era.
Exploiting the finely grained Swiss district level (n = 177)8 and by starting
to unbundle the respective roles of two of the salient institutional changes in
Switzerland at the time, both at the level of private law as well as at the federal
level this paper makes a step forward in disentangling the effects of different
institutional changes.
A second contribution is to relate these statistical findings to the histori-
ographic literature on 19th century Switzerland. The results presented here are
5Note, that the research design for the Swiss data is only cross-sectional. The data availability
is not sufficient for conducting a difference-in-difference strategy, as the first Swiss census data
becomes only available for the time of the treatment.
6Here, codification refers to the comprehensive and coherent revision of private and commercial
law in the 19th century. Frequently, this was a step away from Ancien Régime institutions and
marked the legal foundation of a more modern, bourgeois society (Petrig Schuler, 2009).
7Subject districts are territories or political entities that were under the dominion of the full
members of the old conferation. Cities in subject districts enjoyed more economic freedom and
rights to political self-determination than the rural population, but in general the subject dis-
tricts were dominated and their surplus was consumed by the more privileged members of the
old confederation. These were mainly the city states and the landsgemeinde districts (rural dis-
tricts, typically, of the inneralpine zone), that enjoyed considerable autonomy, quasi-democratic
institutions and that enjoyed extra income from the territories they had subjugated in military
conquests(Holenstein, 2013).
8Note, that many more districts are available as observations in a much smaller geographic
area compared to the study on Germany by Acemoğlu et al. (2011).
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mainly driven by the annexed districts in Northwestern Switzerland. Deaton
(2010, p. 426) urges us to start asking why institutions had a positive impact in
a given context instead of only answering whether they had such an impact at
all. In a survey article about the industrial revolution in Switzerland, Fritzsche
(1996, p. 126) writes, that in Swiss economic history the first half of the 19th
century has been ”more or less avoided” by researchers at the time. However, the
annexed districts in Northwestern Switzerland are known for the watchmaking
industry which developed after French occupation. Findings from Landes (2000)
and Donzé (2009), which cover the development of this industry also at the time
in question, can highlight possible mechanisms that explain why the estimated
effect of early institutional reform turns out to be so large for the treated in the
Swiss context.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the data are presented
in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the random treatment assumption and the
applied IV methodology. Section 2.4 presents the results: French annexation is
found to have a beneficial effects on population growth and the level of indus-
trialisation in the second half of the 19th Century. Applying their IV research
design, the generalised claims by Acemoğlu et al. (2011) pass this test of external
validity and the contribution of institutional reforms at the federal level (early
emancipation from subject district rule) is small and insignificant compared to
the causal effect estimated for French annexation. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
The cross-sectional data covers 177 Swiss districts9 of which 23 were annexed by
France (see Table 2.1).10 The annexed districts are dispersed over geographically,
demographically diverse regions and even across cantonal boundaries (see Table
2.1). They are, for example, characterized by varying shares of native German-
and Frenchspeakers, protestants and catholics. Urbanized districts, like Geneva
9Because of data availability some districts were merged.
10The districts of the Canton of Neuchâtel were also annexed by Napoléon in 1806 and given
to one of his marshalls as a fiefdom. The political and legal order of the Ancien Régime remained
in place. For the purposes of this study, the Neuchâtel districts are not coded as annexed districts
but as part of the control group.
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and Biel, as well as rural districts are included in the annexed group. Except for
Geneva and the landsgemeinde districts Brig, Goms, Herens, Leuk, Raron, Sierre,
Sion and Visp, the annexed were all subject districts before French annexation.
Figure 2.1: Map of Annexed Swiss Districts
Source: map based on unpublished work by Kaspar Staub.
In order to proxy for the state of institutional reform the data set at hand
includes:
• The number of years a district had been annexed by France in 1850 (source:
Coing (1982, 1986) and various entries on cantonal history in the Historical
Dictionary of Switzerland11)
• The number of years a comprehensively codified civil law had been in effect
in 1850 (source: Petrig Schuler (2009) and Coing (1982))
Figure 2.2 shows the spread of proto-industries in Switzerland for the period
right before annexation from 1770 to 1795 (Wartmann, 1875)12. According to this
11http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch
12Digitalisation of maps provided by ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, Karten
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Figure 2.2: Map of Proto-Industries in Switzerland 1770-1795
map, watchmaking and other industries have not yet been established in the
Nortwestern region before annexation. This region, however, drives the results
in subsequent estimates. Compared to the rest of Switzerland the treated region
was rather backwards before treatment. There is no reason to believe that the
annexed districts were intentionally or unintentionally selected on the grounds
of future growth prospects (see also Table 2.2).
The differences in development, culture and geography across districts can be
controlled for by the following variables:
• The share of the district’s population residing in cities that are larger than
5000 inhabitants in 1800 (source: Paul Bairoch (1988)) and the number of
11
Table 2.1: Overview over Annexed Group
District Canton Share of industrial workers Duration of annexation Duration of codification in 1850
Delemont Bern/Jura .56 21 46
Franchesmontagnes Bern/Jura .61 21 46
Porrentruy Bern/Jura .64 21 46
Courtelary Bern .82 21 46
Laufen Bern .60 21 46
Moutier Bern .69 21 46
Laneuville Bern .51 21 46
Arlesheim Basellandschaft .77 21 46
Biel Bern .96 16 46
Geneva Geneva .82 16 46
Brig Valais .58 4 0
Conthey Valais .15 4 0
Entremont Valais .14 4 0
Goms Valais .08 4 0
Herens Valais .07 4 0
Leuk Valais .10 4 0
Martigny Valais .21 4 0
Monthey Valais .37 4 0
Raron Valais .14 4 0
Saint Maurice Valais .34 4 0
Sierre Valais .11 4 0
Sion Valais .29 4 0
Visp Valais .09 4 0
monasteries in 1500 (source: Pfister (1964)) to control for the level of devel-
opment before treatment
• The percentages of Protestants (census 1870) and native German speakers
(census 1880) in the population (source: Swiss Census Data) to control for
religious and cultural differences
• The altitude of the district capital and a full set of dummies covering different
land use types are available to control for geographic factors (source: Swiss
Census Data)
• The geographic distance of the district capital to Paris to control for proxim-
ity to the French capital (source of coordinates: Wikipedia)
• Dummies for subject districts control for the different roles the respective
districts assumed within the Swiss confederation before French treatment.
Districts are not coded as subject districts if they had more than 5000 in-
habitants living in a city at some point in time before 1800 according to
the Paul Bairoch (1988) city population data set, even if they were not full
members of the old Swiss confederation. This is because large cities enjoyed
12
considerable freedom from subject district rule (source: Holenstein (2013))
• Dummies for the type of landuse in the early modern period. Default is land
suitable for grain production. Dummies for mixed type of livestock with
arable farming, for livestock farming and for landuse in the inner alpine
zones are coded. The landuse zones control for geographic factors that
influenced economic activity and institutions in the early modern period
(source: Schluchter (2015))
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
Subject Districts Share Protestants 1870 Share Germanspeaking 1880 Monasteries 1500
Control .76 .61 .71 .94
[.43] [.41] [.41] [1.48]
Annexed .61 .20 .42 .65
[.50] [.33] [.42] [1.53]
All .74 .55 .67 .90
[.44] [.42] [.42] [1.48]
Population Density 1800 Urbanization 1800 Population Share above 1000m Altitude District Capital
Control 73 .04 .09 .61
[60] [.14] [.23] [.22]
Annexed 42 .02 .25 .75
[42] [.11] [.30] [.29]
All 69 .04 .11 .63
[59] [.14] [.25] [.23]
Mixed Landuse Livestock Landuse Inneralpine Landuse Distance to Paris
Control .08 .16 .12 482
[.28] [.37] [.33] [63]
Annexed .22 .04 .57 450
[.42] [.21] [.51] [43]
All .10 .15 .18 478
[.30] [.36] [.39] [62]
Notes: mean values, standard deviations in brackets
The measures used for economic outcomes deserve some further motivation.
It has to be noted that the measures for economic activity such as output estimates
or real wages are typically not at hand for the second half of the 19th century. The
only official source for detailed district level data is population data given by
the censuses. In the absence of more explicit data on economic outcomes the
following measures are included:
• Like Acemoğlu et al. (2011) this paper uses the share of industrial workers
in the overall workforce of the district as a measure of the level of industri-
alisation (source: Swiss Census Data)
• The annualized growth rate of industrial workers in the period 1870-1900
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and of the overall population in the period 1850-1900 to measure the speed
of development (source: Swiss Census Data).
Figure 2.3: Kernel Density Estimate of the Share of Industrial Workers in 1900
Figure 2.3 provides a Kernel density estimate of the share of industrial workers
in 1900. The unconditional distribution of industrialisation levels shows that
there is considerable heterogeneity among districts that demands explanation.
With regard to the estimation technique - estimating a bounded dependent with
ordinary least squares (OLS) - it is encouraging, that the mass of the observations
lies in the middle of the bounded interval (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 661-663).
Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the post-treatment dependent
variables. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.2 indicate that the annexed
group does not differ much from the rest of the sample when it comes to the
state of development before annexation (if at all, annexed districts are at a slight
disadvantage).
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables
% Ind. Workforce Pop. Growth 1850-1900 Ind. Growth 1870-1900
Control .50 .37 .71
[.20] [.57] [1.30]
Annexed .42 .86 1.87
[.29] [.71] [2.15]
All .49 .44 .87
[.22] [.61] [1.49]
Notes: mean values, standard deviations in brackets
2.3 Methodology
The methodological approach of this study is two-pronged. The first prong is
to treat French annexation of Swiss territory as randomly assigned (conditional
on observables). If this holds, the OLS estimates reported in Tables 4.2, 2.5 and
2.6 have a causal interpretation of the effect of annexation13 on economic out-
comes (measured as population growth and the share of industrial workers in the
workforce). The second prong is to take the IV research design established by
Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and test its external validity in the Swiss context. Without
taking a stand on their design, it is legitimate to take it to the Swiss data and to
test their claim of having found a generalisable mechanism for the institutional
change brought about by the French revolution. Their claim, however, passes this
test. For the IV results, reported in Table 2.7, to hold, French annexation needs to
be sufficiently correlated with the institutional change that is considered causal
(strength of the instrument). Moreover, the instrument needs to be randomly as-
signed (conditional on observables) and to affect economic outcomes only through
the identified institutional channel(s). Section 2.3.1 discusses the random treat-
ment assumption and Section 2.3.2 the more exacting additional conditions for
the validity of the IV estimator.
2.3.1 Random Treatment
The historical contingency of French annexation and early institutional reform of
Switzerland at the beginning of the 19th century can be interpreted as a natural
experiment. With the possible exception of Geneva, which had very close ties
13And emancipation from subject district status in the case of Table 2.6.
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to France and the French revolution, France chose not to annex the economically
most promising parts of Switzerland. The annexation depended either on diplo-
matic contingencies or military considerations: in the case of the Prince-Bishopric
of Basel (in the Northwest of Switzerland)14, France annexed these mostly rural
districts because they were argued to be more closely associated with the Holy
Roman Empire (which France had defeated in the War of the First Coalition) than
with the Swiss confederation, which had remained neutral in the conflict. The
Valais districts were annexed on military grounds to protect the lines of commu-
nications with French troops in Northern Italy. By fostering the revolution and its
institutions in Switzerland, France aimed to create an ally that would secure its
eastern border against Austrian influence(Grab, 2003, p. 112-122).
The emancipation of subject districts came about in three waves: in the first
wave, annexed subject districts were immediately freed from all obligations to
the old members of the confederation as they became proper parts of France. The
second wave was a result of the Mediation Act in 1803, when some former subject
districts were put on an equal footing with the incumbent members, as newly
established cantons, e.g. the districts of Aargau, Ticino, Thurgau and Vaud, on
the federal level (Grab, 2003). The third wave of emancipation came about when
the city cantons granted freedom to their remaining hinterland in the context of the
revolutionary uprisings around 1830. The first wave of emancipation can be taken
as randomly selected on the basis of the argument made for random selection
of annexation. The second wave of emancipation was by Napoléons decree for
political motives equally exogenous to long run economic development. Even the
revolutionary changes in 1830 probably still had a large element of randomness,
even if more prosperous rural areas were more likely to successfully revolt and
had higher incentives to push for institutional reform. All in all, however, these
changes are taken as sufficiently random for the purposes of this test. Using
the time structure of emancipation, a measure of early emancipation of subject
districts has been constructed.15
Given the spatial structure of the Swiss and German data, it is noteworthy
14Note that distance to Paris is available as a control.
15The share of years, the district had been free, that is the number of years the former subject
district has been free in 1850 divided by the maximum number of years.
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that the annexed districts are lumped together in the case of Germany. Thus,
it is possible that the annexed districts share certain characteristics with each
other which distinguish them from the control group. For example through the
presence of cultural, geographic factors or through proximity to trading partners.
The annexed districts of Switzerland are more spread out, but the results are
mostly driven by the Northwestern annexation region. As a consequence, the
randomization assumption could be questioned if an unobserved confounding
factor is suspected to have affected this region in particular.
2.3.2 Instrumental Variables
A thorough methodological review of the applied IV methodology is beyond the
scope of this paper.16 Deaton (2010, p. 426) points out, that ”under ideal circum-
stances, randomized evaluations of projects are useful for obtaining a convincing
estimate of the average effect of a program”. The strength of the approach lies
in the ability to recover estimates that are not biased by omitted variables or
endogeneity bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The instrument (here, French annexation as a dummy or its duration in years)
needs to be sufficiently correlated with the causal variable of interest (codification
of private law). Instrument strength alone, however, is not enough to justify
the use of annexation as an instrument. In order to be a valid instrument, the
exclusion restriction has to hold as well. This requirement consists of two parts:
the instrument needs to be randomly assigned with respect to the outcome and
it has to affect outcomes only through the proposed causal mechanism (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009, p. 117). This paper has argued that annexation can be thought
of as randomly assigned in the given historical context. To argue that French
annexation affects economic outcomes only through institutional changes is not
as straightforward.
French annexation has changed institutions in Switzerland.17 However, it did
so by frequently changing a bundle of institutions at once. Therefore it is hard
16Such surveys exist: Deaton (2010) gives a critical review about the application of IV and
randomization techniques in the context of development studies. More general reviews can be
found in Angrist and Pischke (2009), Heckman and Urzua (2009) and Wooldridge (2002).
17See, for example, Coing (1982) or Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012, p. 289-294).
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if not impossible to disentangle the precise effect of each institutional change.
This paper takes the view, that the comprehensive codification of private law
with economic freedoms and equality before the law is a main component of
the institutional change that the French revolution brought to Ancien Régime
territories. Change that is hard to disentangle from other institutional, cultural
and social changes. In this sense, the identification of the causal mechanism is
potentially blurry.
Moreover, the French came as invaders. They plundered and taxed Switzer-
land, they raised armies and garrisoned troops. On top of this, Switzerland
became a theater of war.18 This paper does not discern a regional pattern of such
war effects that would be congruent with annexation. It would be problematic,
for example, if the French spared the annexed territories from plundering or be-
coming a battleground. Still, the presented results can be meaningful, if such
negative shocks have petered out by the end of the 19th century (as is suggested
by the evidence presented in Table 4.2). Another complication could arise, if the
annexed territories have profited from positive effects of French annexation, such
as major infrastructure investments, which are known to have taken place in the
Valais with the expansion of the road network around the Simplon pass.19 In this
regard it is noteworthy, that the results are not driven by the Valais districts.
Moreover, the French invaders may have brought not only changes in institu-
tions as captured globally by the phenomenon of codification, but they may have
changed local societies in another way that the literature argues to be meaningful
for long run development in the 19th century - for example, the spirit of enlight-
enment which Mokyr (2010) highlights in his account of British development or
bourgeois society that McCloskey (2011) proposes as the key driver of the modern
world. If such changes coincided with French annexation, which they likely did,
and played such an important role as argued by these authors, the presented
IV estimates in Table 2.7 can be misleading because they would be confounding
these effects with the effect of codification. Mokyr (2010, p. 261-268) mentions,
for example, trade barriers as a major characteristic of Ancien Régime institutions
18See, for example, Maissen (2015) or Oechsli et al. (1922).
19See, for example, Maissen (2015) or Oechsli et al. (1922).
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(besides the class and the guild system). This raises the issue, that French annexa-
tion may have changed custom regimes. Instead of legal changes, the causal effect
of interest may have been access to the French markets during the time of annex-
ation. If such views should be taken, given the random treatment assumption,
the reduced form estimates would still be of interest as they highlight the role of
French annexation for social change and economic development in 19th century
Switzerland. But the respective contribution of the different causal mechanism
linking French annexation to economic outcomes could not be determined and
the IV estimates of the causal effect of codification would be confounded with
other channels of causation.
The applied methodology is no cheap panacea. In particular, the defense of
the assumptions of randomization and instrument validity themselves require a
precise understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms and the historical
context. Deaton (2010, p. 426-427) argues that it is often dubious whether es-
timates obtained from IV studies (which may well be internally valid in the local
context of the sample) can be extended to the general case. In this light, checking
the external validity of the Acemoğlu et al. (2011) research design with Swiss data
and in other European contexts is a particularly worthwhile undertaking: because
IV estimation does not necessarily yield generalisable results, it is important to
test the predictions of landmark studies with additional data.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Causal Effects of French Annexation
The outcome of interest is economic development in the second half of the 19th
century, when richer Swiss census data can be used. Figure 2.2 shows that proto-
industrial clusters (for example, watchmaking and textiles) have not yet spread to
the Northwestern treatment region before the treatment was applied. Figure 2.4
is from the same set of maps20 but displays the spread of proto-industries in 1870
(around the time when the outcome variables of this study are measured). Note
20From (Wartmann, 1875).
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that by now, the proto-industrial clusters have spread to the treatment region.
Figure 2.4: Map of Proto-Industries in Switzerland 1870
Using data for the second half of the 19th century has advantages: The first is
to rule out that an immediate negative impact from annexation distorts the results.
The second is that this is the period when we observe both economic outcomes
and institutional diversity in the available Swiss data. Over the course of the
19th century there is variety in institutional quality: Codification projects are
implemented canton by canton. Some cantons did not even codify until private
law was homogenized at the federal level in Switzerland in 1912 (Coing, 1982, p.
1864-1866).
Exploratory regressions with population growth as an outcome variable have
20
the advantage that the outcome is available from 1800 to 1950 (with no data
points between 1800 and 1850) and allow comparisons of the annexation effect in
different periods. They yield a negative coefficient of annexation but a positive
net effect for the annexed subject districts in the early 19th century. In terms of
population growth, the subject districts have profited whereas the more privileged
districts suffered from annexation. In the second half of the 19th century all
annexed districts, regardless of being a subject district or not, experienced higher
population growth. A treated (subject) district would grow 30 (47) per cent
more over a period of 50 years compared to if it were not treated. In the early
20th century, when the institutional differences under consideration had largely
converged, it no longer matters for population growth whether a district was once
annexed by France (reported in Table 4.2).
This should not be interpreted as evidence that the treatment was necessarily
beneficial: it could have been that growth in annexed districts was inhibited
because of annexation or that, as the descriptive statistics suggest, the annexed
districts were a little more backward in sociodemographic development at the
outset and that we observe population levels catching up. This could lead to
positive bias in the estimate. Since the research design is entirely cross-sectional,
an economic outcome measure in levels would be useful to measure the long run
effects of annexation. Nevertheless, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that it is the difference in institutions brought about by annexation that explains
part of the heterogeneity in economic outcomes in the second half of the 19th
century.
The other available outcome variable (in levels) is the share of industrial work-
ers in the total workforce for the years 1870, 1880, 1888 and 1900. With regard to
the results presented on population growth it is reassuring to note that population
growth from 1850 to 1900 and growth of the industrial workforce from 1870 to
1900 are closely correlated (Figure 2.5). Compared to population growth rates,
this outcome has the advantage of being a proxy for economic development in
levels. A positive effect of treatment on industrialisation levels would remain
informative even if the effect on the growth rate were largely driven by a catch-up
process. A disadvantage of this variable is that it is not available for the time
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Table 2.4: Population Growth and Annexation
(1) (2) (3)
1800-1850 1850-1900 1900-1950
French Annexation (FA) -0.170 0.527∗ 0.115
(0.181) (0.023) (0.357)
Subject District (SD) -0.0165 -0.372∗∗ -0.263∗
(0.835) (0.007) (0.017)
FA-SD Interaction 0.285∗ 0.243 -0.000561
(0.017) (0.320) (0.996)
Share Protestants 1870 0.0448 0.0579 -0.127
(0.672) (0.704) (0.190)
Share Germanspeaking 1880 0.200∗∗ -0.0765 0.358∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.420) (0.000)
Monasteries in 1500 0.0237 0.0640 0.0918∗∗
(0.345) (0.154) (0.003)
Population Density 1800 -0.00150∗∗ 0.00177 -0.000638
(0.002) (0.193) (0.560)
Urbanization in 1800 0.528 0.814∗ -0.141
(0.118) (0.015) (0.646)
Altitude District capital -0.505∗∗ -0.139 -0.664∗∗
(0.001) (0.627) (0.004)
Mixed Landuse -0.0406 0.0368 -0.0567
(0.493) (0.864) (0.625)
Livestock Landuse 0.0134 -0.0914 -0.143
(0.885) (0.541) (0.179)
Inneralpine Landuse 0.146 -0.311 0.159
(0.132) (0.167) (0.444)
Distance to Paris -0.00218∗∗ 0.000589 -0.000191
(0.003) (0.568) (0.790)
Constant 1.944∗∗∗ 0.306 0.919∗
(0.000) (0.584) (0.049)
N 177 177 177
p-values in parentheses
SE are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered by cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 2.5: Industrial Workforce and Population Growth
before 1870. The maps of industrial clusters from Wartmann (1875) suggest that
the treatment region had hardly had any sign of proto-industrial development
before the treatment (see also Figure 2.2). For the purposes of this paper it is the
most telling economic outcome variable available.21
The regression outputs presented in Table 2.5 reveal, that the treatment effect
of annexation on subject districts was positive, while the effect of annexation on
non-subject districts is negative. The first column reports the effect of treatment
as a dummy. According to this estimate, a treated subject district is about 20 per
cent more industrialised compared to if it were not treated. The second estimate
measures treatment as years of French annexation. Increasing the duration of
treatment for a subject district by five years (one standard deviation) raises the
level of industrialisation by about 7 per cent. It is striking that according to these
estimates only the former subject districts profited in terms of industrialisation
21Note that the dependent variable is a fraction. In this case it could be more appropriate
to use log-odds ratio of the fraction as the dependent variable. For details refer to Wooldridge
(2002, p. 661-663). The qualitative results in this paper are robust to using the log-odds ratio of
industrialisation as the dependent variable.
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Share Protestants 1870 0.0316 0.0295
(0.352) (0.359)
Share Germanspeaking 1880 0.0618 0.0524
(0.059) (0.104)
Monasteries in 1500 -0.00207 -0.00297
(0.831) (0.773)
Population Density 1800 0.00104∗∗∗ 0.00106∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Urbanization 1800 0.259∗ 0.324∗∗
(0.014) (0.004)
Altitude District Capital -0.00411 -0.0377
(0.960) (0.643)
Mixed Landuse 0.104 0.0938
(0.100) (0.148)
Livestock Landuse -0.0846∗ -0.0681
(0.027) (0.072)
Innteralpine Landuse -0.297∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)






SE are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered by cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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levels from French treatment. The results are robust to using the shares of indus-
trial workers from other years (1870, 1880, 1888, 1910), yielding coefficients of the
same sign and same order of magnitude.
2.4.2 Subject Districts: French Annexation or Federal Autonomy?
The presented evidence highlights the positive effect of French annexation on
subject districts. There is evidence that cities and landsgemeinde districts were
affected differently by French annexation. Taking a closer look at subject districts
only, two different mechanisms could drive the results. The subject districts
could have profited from reforms in private law brought about by the French.
Abolition of feudalism, freedom of occupational choice, marriage and to move as
well as equality before the law culminated in the codification of the Code Civil.
According to Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) these
radical changes of private law institutions can be identified as the driver behind
the superior economic development of treated regions in Germany, but should
also have had an effect in Switzerland. Also, feudal relations between subject
districts and their former masters were reorganized in the 19th century. This had
an effect on land taxes and other transfers that were due to the more privileged
members of the Swiss confederation, because the cantons had some souvereignty
over deciding under which conditions a landowner could get rid of the Feudal
payments (Schenkel, 1931).
Table 2.6 reports estimates for the subsample of former subject districts. The
share of industrial workers is regressed on an annexation dummy or the duration
of annexation as well as on the measure of early emancipation of former subject
districts. In this statistical horse race, the measures of annexation outperform the
measure of early emancipation. If random selection holds for both variables of
interest, the estimates get a causal interpretation. The null hypothesis for early
emancipation of former subject districts cannot be rejected for this specification.
French annexation may have worked through an alternative channel.
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Early Emancipation of SD -0.0163 -0.0289
(0.802) (0.660)
Share Protestants 1870 -0.000271 -0.00332
(0.994) (0.931)
Share Germanspeaking 1880 0.0553 0.0435
(0.195) (0.303)
Monasteries in 1500 0.0145 0.0157
(0.306) (0.261)
Population Density 1800 0.00235∗∗∗ 0.00245∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Altitude of District Capital 0.131 0.115
(0.292) (0.353)
Mixed Landuse 0.0870 0.0709
(0.195) (0.299)
Livestock Landuse -0.0263 -0.0230
(0.602) (0.634)
Inneralpine Landusee -0.259∗∗∗ -0.170∗
(0.001) (0.011)






SE are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered by cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
26
2.4.3 IV - Testing the Acemoğlu et al. (2011) Design
Codification of private law (and other changes in institutions) has been proposed
by Acemoğlu et al. (2011) as the causal mechanism of interest. Furthermore,
Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012, p. 289-294) maintain that Napoléon exported the
French revolution not only to parts of Germany, but also to Italy, the Netherlands
and Switzerland. Adapting the methodology proposed in Acemoğlu et al. (2011)
to the Swiss context and data, this paper provides a test of whether the causal
mechanism they identified for Germany helps to explain the Swiss data as well.
This is particularly interesting, because the German treatment region is com-
paratively well endowed with favorable geographical factors (natural resource
abundance, good waterways and the proximity to North Sea harbours) which
makes the exclusion restriction of their IV approach unlikely to hold. The Swiss
treatment region, by comparison, is much less at an advantage over the rest of
Switzerland. Indeed the summary statistics presented earlier indicate that the
treated region is rather at a disadvantage.
What about key natural resources that could have promoted industrial devel-
opment for the treated Swiss districts? Consulting the historiographic literature
reveals, that at least initially, steel production on very modest scales existed in
various parts of 19th century Switzerland, notably also in the annexed Northwest-
ern region. A fledgling metalworking industry may have provided a first mover
advantage to the favored locations (among them the treatment region), however,
the maximum yearly production was only 13 700 tons at the end of the 1850ies
in all of Switzerland. With the spread of the railroad network cheaper steel from
abroad became available. Steel production shrank and by the 1880ies only one
blast furnace was left (Fritzsche, 2001, p. 133). If the results of Acemoğlu et al.
(2011) were driven only or mostly by geographic factors, it would be ex ante con-
ceivable that an application of their research design to the Swiss context, that is
relatively poor in natural resources (geographic factors) compared to the German
treatment region, and not at an advantage, compared to the Swiss control, would
fail to corroborate their findings.
At first glance, Figure 2.6 reveals that there is no clear correlation of early
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Figure 2.6: Codification not correlated with Industrialisation in the Sample
reform with industrialisation in the sample. Many districts that turn out to be
highly industrialised in 1900 did not dispose of a comprehensively codified private
law in 1850. Considering only the subsample of those that were either forced
or chose to implement comprehensively codified private law before 1850, the
relationship between early reform and industrialisation is clearly positive (Figure
2.7). From the point of view of the institutions hypothesis this observation is to
be expected: institutional advance is correlated with economic development.
Many of the annexed districts were forced to adopt the Code Civil under
French rule. After Napoléons defeat the reestablished elites of the Ancien Régime
wanted to roll back institional reform. This was the case in the Northwestern
annexation region which for the most part had come under the rule of Bern. The
goverment of Bern appointed a commission of legal experts to deal with this task.
Eventually this commission convinced the authorities of Bern that the Code Civil
had worked so well during the last ten years that substituting it with the older
Ancien Régime institutions would be irresponsible. Indeed, the Northwestern
annexation region kept their French institutions even after the old law of Bern
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Figure 2.7: Codification positively related with Industrialisation among early
Reformers
was modernized itself. In the Northwestern annexation region the Code Civil
was in force until in 1912 private law was homogenized at the federal level in
Switzerland (Coing, 1982, p. 1864-1866). A similar development took place in
Geneva, where with minor revisions the Code Civil continued to be effective until
1912. In Geneva as well, the legal experts had come to the conclusion that despite
of the restaurative impetus of the time the Code Civil was the best of all available
alternatives and that a reinstitution of Ancien Régime institutions would make
no sense (Coing, 1982, p. 1866-1869).
The output presented in Table 2.7 suggests a strong reduced form relationship
between industrialisation and the duration of annexation. The F-test for the ex-
cluded instrument yields a value of 22.49 for the first stage regression. This is
a strong instrument. If the exclusion restriction holds, the coefficient of interest
can be interpreted: one standard deviation of earlier codification raises industri-
alisation by approximately 14 per cent.22 Thus, with the given research design as
22These results are robust to the exclusion of the two most urban districts among the treated
(Biel and Geneva).
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proposed by Acemoğlu et al. (2011), their claim of having found a generalisable
effect cannot be rejected with the Swiss data at hand.
The Swiss data, however, differs from the data on Germany in terms of struc-
ture and available control variables. This makes it hard to compare the quantit-
ative effects estimated here directly with each the estimates from Acemoğlu et al.
(2011). Most closely related are the respective estimated effects of the duration
of annexation on industrialisation levels on the district level. Multiplying the
estimated effects by one standard deviation of the duration of annexation (Ger-
many: ca. 6 years; Switzerland: ca. 5 years) yields an effect of 1.4 per cent in 1895
and 1.9 per cent in 1907 for Germany and 4.8 per cent in 1900 for Switzerland.
The estimated effects for Switzerland are larger, but they are in the same order
of magnitude for both studies. As opposed to Acemoğlu et al. (2009, 2011), this
paper finds evidence for short run negative effects of annexation for districts that
are not coded as subject districts (see Table 2.4 column 1).
The presented estimates can be interpreted as a series of tests for which the
institutions hypothesis as formulated in Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and Acemoğlu
and Robinson (2012) and their claim of having found a generalisable mechanism
can fail. It is a striking and not necessarily expected result, that applying their
methodology to Swiss data supports their findings for the German case, in which
the annexed region is so strongly favored by geographic factors.
Furthermore, note that in the Swiss context, the results reported in Tables 4.2
and 2.5 have pointed to a possible complication: did treated subject districts profit
from the reform of their private law institutions or rather because annexation
freed them from being a subject district? Looking at subject districts only and
controlling for the timing of emancipation from subject district status continues
to produce a statistically and economically significant positive treatment effect
from annexation. The hypothesis that the subject districts profited mainly from
early emancipation of their status on the federal level is rejected.
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Table 2.7: IV Estimates
Reduced form First stage IV estimate






Early Emancipation of SD -0.009 16.721** -0.170
[0.095] [8.980] [0.135]
(0.925) (0.075) (0.208)
SD -0.057 11.818** -0.171*
[0.062] [5.757] [0.096]
(0.369) (0.051) (0.075)
Share Protestants 1870 0.035 6.231 -0.025
[0.043] [3.748] [0.056]
(0.427) (0.109) (0.655)
Share Germanspeaking 1880 0.050 -2.466 0.073
[0.039] [4.811] [0.069]
(0.218) (0.613) (0.285)
Monasteries in 1500 -0.004 1.942*** -0.023
[0.013] [0.671] [0.015]
(0.727) (0.008) (0.122)
Population Density 1800 0.001*** -0.019 0.001***
[0.000] [0.015] [0.000]
(0.004) (0.224) (0.001)
Urbanization 1800 0.324*** -15.832** 0.477***
[0.109] [7.258] [0.147]
(0.007) (0.039) (0.001)
Altitude District Capital -0.047 9.789** -0.142
[0.142] [4.033] [0.149]
(0.743) (0.023) (0.342)
Mixed Landuse 0.105 -3.944 0.143*
[0.072] [2.839] [0.084]
(0.160) (0.178) (0.087)
Livestock Landuse -0.064 3.017 -0.093
[0.044] [3.637] [0.061]
(0.161) (0.415) (0.124)
Inneralpine Landuse -0.251*** -7.566 -0.178*
[0.071] [8.088] [0.104]
(0.002) (0.359) (0.088)
Distance to Paris 0.001** -0.084** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.033] [0.001]
(0.018) (0.017) (0.003)
Constant 0.098 23.959 -0.133
[0.239] [19.349] [0.360]
(0.685) (0.228) (0.711)
R-squared 0.537 0.693 0.270
N 177 177 177
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets
clustered according to cantonal boundaries
P-values in parentheses
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2.4.4 Reference to the Historiographic Literature
It is noteworthy, that only subject districts profited from French annexation in
terms of industrialisation levels. The reasons for this remain speculative, but the
finding resonates with the historiographic literature (e.g. Maissen (2015)) which
describes that the reaction to the French invaders differed across Switzerland.
Whereas the French were hailed in the subject districts of Vaud as liberators, they
met resistance from the privileged members of the old Swiss federation, be they
city or landsgemeinde cantons.
This makes sense, as those latter entities profited from ruling and taxing the
subject districts Schenkel (1931). In addition, it is possible that the cities and
landsgemeinde districts already disposed of institutions that were of such quality
as to empower their citizens sufficiently to engage in politics and profitable ven-
tures, including commerce and early industries. Thus, the disruptive, negative
effects of such radical reform may have outweighed the advantages from more
”inclusive institutions” brought by the French revolution from the perspective of
these more privileged or, possibly even, institutionally more advanced districts.
Subject districts appear to have profited from early reform in the spirit of
the French revolution. However, industrial centers like Zürich and St. Gallen
adopted equivalent codifications of private law only much later, without being
visibly held back in development compared to other Swiss districts. Note also,
that the Valais region - although annexed for four years - was not endowed with
French civil law23 and did not choose to adopt it until after 1850. Most of the
annexed non-subject districts lie in this region. Therefore, the result that only
subject districts profited from French annexation could be an artefact of the data
structure: most non-subject districts in the annexed sample did not profit from
French private law and were only shortly a part of France (landsgemeinde districts
in the upper Valais). This could be potential evidence for codification (as opposed
to other effects of annexation) driving the results on economic development. For
those, however, who chose or were forced to adopt a comprehensively codified
23This is exceptional. All other European territories in Holland, Nortwestern Germany and the
Hansa cities annexed in the last wave of French expansion in 1810 adopted the Code Civil (Coing,
1982, p. 1888).
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private law before 1850 (the annexed districts were forced, but some other cantons
adopted codified private law after the Napoléonic era), the earlier codification was
associated with higher economic outcomes and the IV estimates, if the basic outlay
of the research design by Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and its adaptation to the Swiss
context is acceptable, point to a causal effect of codification (or more broadly
speaking: change in the institutions of private law) on industrialisation for the
treated.
The Northwestern annexation region is driving the results. These are the
districts that did in fact experience the institutional changes of interest, as op-
posed to the annexed Valais, where the Code Civil was never instituted. After
French annexation, the Swiss Northwest became known for the development of
its watchmaking industry (and the spread of other industrial clusters, such as
textiles). Findings in the historiographic literature dealing with the watchmaking
industry are consistent with the hypothesis that better institutions led to more
rapid industrialisation in the annexed districts. Landes (2000, p. 12) points out,
that watchmaking as an industry is comparatively free from local constraints24:
The raw materials used represent only a small fraction of total cost, the pro-
duction process does not require large amounts of fuel or energy and the final
product is easy to transport to distant consumers. Landes argues that because
of this freedom, the watchmaking industry frequently moved its production into
regions with a favorable institutional environment. Therefore, observing that the
watchmaking industrial clusters have spread to the treated region as opposed to
other neighboring regions that were not treated is telling (See Figures 2.2 and 2.4
in comparison).
This paper does not argue that the institutional reform brought about by
French invaders triggered industrialisation in Switzerland. Indeed, the evidence
from Wartman (1873) shows that proto-industries were already well established
in Swiss districts under the Ancien Régime. However, when the watchmaking
industry expanded in Switzerland during the 19th century it did so in a region
that had been characterized by institutional change in the spirit of the French
24This freedom needs to be qualified. Donzé (2009, p. 39-40) observes that the watchmaking
industry is characterized by industrial clusters. Thus, the Northwestern annexed districts are likely
to have profited from their immediate proximity to the already established cluster in Neuchâtel.
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revolution.
Donzé (2009, p. 15, 24) and Landes (2000, p. 230) argue that freedom from
the guild system was one reason for the relocation of watchmaking artisans and
the development of production clusters, in particular in Northwestern Switzer-
land.25 Before the French revolution took hold in Geneva, some watchmakers
relocated production to France were political institutions were more inclusive
than in Geneva (Landes, 2000, p. 265). Whereas the rural regions in Switzerland
were typically free from the guild system, the guilds were strong in towns and
cities. In the Northwestern annexed districts even the towns and cities were free
from guilds after annexation, allowing for rapid industrialisation in the cities as
well. After annexation and the ensuing institutional changes, the Northwestern
annexation districts provided a favorable institutional environment to the spread
of industry. This paper does not make a stand as to how to quantify the respect-
ive contributions of freedom from the guild system in comparison with other
institutional changes, such as the codification of private law.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides an out of sample test of the findings for Germany in Acemoğlu
et al. (2011). It is a striking and not necessarily expected result, that the qualitative
and quantitative results and the time structure of effects obtained for Germany
can be replicated for the Swiss natural experiment. In this regard, the effect of
French annexation could indeed be driven by a generalisable mechanism, through
the institutional mechanism proposed by Acemoğlu et al. (2009, 2011); Acemoğlu
and Robinson (2012). The instrument does not appear to be weak and the case
for random assignment is comparatively strong for the Swiss data. The reduced
form estimates highlight the role of French annexation in explaining the regional
heterogeneity of industrialisation in the second half of 19th Century Switzerland.
As such, this paper makes a contribution to the replication of landmark IV studies
25Landes (1999, p. 251-268) acknowledges the role of the French revolution in changing the
institutional landscape of the Ancien Régime in Western Europe, but in his account of the Swiss
watchmaking industry he does not mention French annexation of Northwestern Switzerland as
the direct cause of beneficial institutions (Landes, 2000).
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in the field of development and institutional economics, for which - even if they
can be seen as having high internal validity - we do not know so much about their
external validity.
To argue that annexation only worked through institutions, or even more
precisely through the codification of private law, as a causal channel is harder.
The historiographic literature, particularly on the watchmaking industry in the
treatment region of Northwestern Switzerland, suggests several alternative mech-
anisms instead of codification (for example, the abolition of guilds, trade relations
under French rule, changes in culture, etc.) that all seem plausible. With the data
at hand it is not possible to quantify their respective contributions.
Beyond the test of external validity for Acemoğlu et al. (2011) and firmly
establishing the causal effect of French annexation on economic outcomes, the
Swiss data offer an opportunity to quantify the respective contributions of French
annexation and the emancipation from subject district status. In a statistical horse
race between the two, the institutional reforms at the federal level (emancipation
from subject district status) are neither statistically nor economically significant.
In this regard, this project has exploited an opportunity in the Swiss context
to make a novel contribution towards the unbundling of different institutional
changes in the Napoleonic era.
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Chapter 3
German Professors and the 1871
Tonhalle Riots in Zurich
3.1 Introduction
After the Swiss vote on curbing immigration in February 2014 there was dis-
cussion of how this would affect the ability of Swiss employers, especially the
universities, to attract and retain talent. In the aftermath of the vote, Antonio
Loprieno, President of the Rectors’ Conference of Swiss Universities, speculated
that individuals sensitive to cultural phenomena would be heavily affected by the
vote (NZZ, 11.02.2014). More recently, Kaspar Villiger, former Federal Councillor,
worried that Switzerland is taking “enormous risks” of being no longer attractive
to the foreign talent pool after the February 2014 vote (NZZ, 29.06.2015). Simil-
arly, Sociologist Dirk Helbing at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)
reasoned: “People will think twice about whether they want to do science in a
country where foreigners feel they might not be fully welcome” (Nature, 506, Feb.
20, 2014, p. 277).1
It is still unclear how todays push and pull factors at Swiss universities and
the relevant academic outside-options will affect Swiss research institutions in the
medium and long run. However, academic institutions hinge critically on their
ability to recruit and retain the best available talent. We turn to the 19th Century
and examine the long run experience of the University of Zurich (UZH) and the
ETH Zurich with foreign talent from 1833 to 1913 and how it changed over time.
1There is also anecdotal evidence of academic personnel leaving Zurich
(www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4011533.ece).
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We present quantitative and anecdotal evidence suggesting that it was affected
by the political situation, both in Switzerland and abroad. For Continental Europe,
this observation period can be divided into two phases: first until about 1870, a
rather turbulent phase of (often failing) liberal revolutions, wars of national unific-
ation characterized by large real wage inequalities and, second, a relatively calm
period, characterized by real income convergence (Williamson, 1995, p. 154-155).
The historical experience shows that, despite paying low wages in international
comparison, the two Swiss universities in Zurich profited greatly from an inflow
of foreign talent in the first phase. We note that, initially, the faculty was of com-
paratively high quality, resembling the characteristics of German top-institutions
at the time. However, although academic wages in Zurich started to catch up in
the second phase and eventually gained an edge over German wages, it became
more difficult to maintain the high quality composition of professors. Depending
on the changing attractivity of the academic environment at the German-speaking
universities outside Switzerland, which was the relevant alternative for the vast
majority of the professors in Zurich, the composition of professors started to re-
semble that of an entry-level university in the German-speaking academic world.
Before Switzerland developed a larger talent pool of its own towards the end of
the 19th century, a considerable share of full professors in Zurich were foreigners
(Figure 3.1). From evidence such as the autobiographies of economists among
the professors we learn that seeking and keeping employment at the newly-
established institutions in Zurich, despite comparatively low salaries, was initially
driven by political issues in the aftermath of the failed liberal revolutions in the
German states. The ensuing wars of national unification established Prussian
hegemony, which played a role for some professors to prefer staying in Zurich.
However, it also led to anti-German sentiments in Zurich, which made it harder for
the German expatriates to integrate themselves. The qualitative evidence points
to the role of political events in the allocation of internationally mobile academic
personnel and to the political orientation of German professors in Zurich at the
time.
Studying the duration of individual employment spells and their changing at-
trition rates at the two Zurich institutions from their foundation until 1913 allows
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Figure 3.1: Professors at Zurich, 1833-1933





















































Only full professors; data source: Erziehungsrat des Kantons Zürich (1938, p.
960-1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983, p. 665-748), Eidgenössische
Technische Hochschule (1955, p. 226-254)
us to gain quantitative insights into the historical interactions of the real income
differential and the timing of political events with respect to retaining foreign
talent at the two universities in Zurich. We note that, initially, the faculty was
of comparatively high quality despite the low income of professors in Zurich,
resembling the characteristics of German top-institutions. However, although
academic wages in Zurich started to catch up and eventually gained an edge over
German wages, it became more difficult to maintain the high quality composition
of professors. Depending on the changing attractivity of the academic environ-
ment at the German-speaking universities outside Switzerland, which was the
relevant alternative for the vast majority of the professors in Zurich, the com-
position of professors started to resemble that of an entry-level university in the
German-speaking academic world.
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Using wage data from UZH, ETH and a suitable German reference university
(Bonn), we are able to assess quantitatively the relative indifference of the German
academics to income in their choice to stay in Zurich. Applying a proportional
hazards model we show that employment spells were prolonged or shortened by
political events. The quantitative evidence suggests that the hazard of a German
professor leaving Zurich was unusually low at the time of the failed liberal re-
volution of 1848 in the German states and that a large share of German professors
left Zurich immediately after the Franco-Prussian war. The latter phenomenon
is not necessarily driven by nationalist excitement and the new academic oppor-
tunities in the German Empire at the end of the 19th century, but coincides with
the Tonhalle Riots in Zurich: a progrom-like riot2 against the festivities of German
expatriates in Zurich3 on the occasion of the unification of Germany after the suc-
cessful war against France. The Germans at the Tonhalle experienced virtually
no protection against a violent mob of locals and a group of French army officers
who attacked the guests, including women, of the festivities until late into the
night and as they fled, although the Zurich police forces were present observing
the events.4 The ensuing outrage among the German community led to violent
fighting for four days until four batallions Swiss military subdued the unrest.5
The qualitative evidence and the timing of German professors leaving Zurich im-
mediately and shortly after these events suggests that at least part6 of that loss was
2For this characterisation of the event refer to (Urner, 1976, p. 64): “Als sich die anges-
tauten Spannungen im Zürcher Tonhallekrawall vom 9. März 1871 in einer progromartigen Stim-
mung gegen die Teilnehmer der deutschen Sieges- und Reichsgründungsfeier entluden, nahm
der schweizerisch-deutsche Pressekonflikt die heftigsten Formen an.”
3These festivities were initiated by Gottfried Semper, former liberal revolutionary of 1848 and
founding father of ETH’s architectural school, Otto Wesendonck, banker and philanthropist, Adolf
Gusserow, former rektor of UZH and Adolf Exner, professor of law. These individuals represent
the most accomplished members of the German expatriate community who were locally and
internationally well-connected and had made substantial contributions to business, science and
the arts in Zurich at the time (Urner, 1976).
4See Urner (1976, p. 211-212).
5As the violence escalated in protests against the conduct of the Zurich police and to free
incarcerated Germans, five Germans were killed. Refer to de Weck (2013) for a short summary of
the events. For a more thorough account of the events and its repercussions in Zurich and abroad
refer to Urner (1976, p. 207-221).
6On the one hand, unification also implied a larger labour market for academics, with new
universities founded, especially technical universities, which made the German university system
more attractive for professors in Zurich. On the other hand, liberal or progressive Germans
experienced the social climate in Germany as oppressive, see for example Sieveking [1935] (1977,
p. 104).
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directly caused by the anti-German sentiment which culminated in the Tonhalle
Riots. Furthermore, we present quantitative evidence for the loss in attractivity
of the universities in Zurich as employers of foreign talent in the following years.
Our evidence suggests that the two universities suffered from this sudden loss
of senior faculty members and struggled to find adequate replacements over the
course of several years.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the data on the pro-
fessors at UZH and ETH and the data on income are presented in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 illustrates the survival analysis with a proportional hazards model.
Section 3.4 presents our results on the characteristics of the professors employed
in Zurich. Applying a proportional hazards model allows us to illustrate the
attrition suffered among the German professors at UZH and ETH over time, par-
ticularly after the Tonhalle Riots, controlling for differences in wages, the different
ability of UZH and ETH to retain talent, as well as for age. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Professors
The data set on full professors appointed by the University of Zurich (UZH) in the
period 1833-1933 contains 273 individuals.7 The information on the professors is
compiled from the short biographies in the two Festschriften for the 100 and the 150
years anniversaries of the University in 1933 and 1983 (Erziehungsrat des Kantons
Zürich 1938, p. 960-1001, Rektorat der Universität Zürich 1983, p. 665-748). For
the technical university (ETH), we have 249 full professors.8 The observation
period covers the years 1855-1933, the main source is the Festschrift for the 100
years anniversary of the ETH (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, 1955) and
7Among them are 12 economists: Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878), Victor Böhmert (1829-1918),
Julius Platter (1844-1923), August Sartorius von Waltershausen (1852-1938), Julius Wolf (1862-
1937), Heinrich Herkner (1863-1932), Heinrich Sieveking (1871-1945), Joseph Eßlen (1879-1935),
Werner Bleuler (1886-1928), Eugen Grossmann (1879-1963), Manuel Saitzew (1885-1951), and
Richard Büchner (1899-1984).
8There are 7 economists: Atoine-Elisée Cherbuliez (1797-1869), Gustav Cohn (1840-1919), Pierre
Charton (1853-1917), Max Turmann (1866-1943), and Eugen Böhler (1893-1977). Victor Böhmert
(1829-1918) and Julius Platter (1844-1923) had a joint appointment with the UZH.
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Figure 3.2: Professors at UZH 1833-1933: Origin and Destination
Origin
Destination
Data source: Erziehungsrat des Kantons Zürich (1938, p.
960-1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983, p. 665-
748)
the Professoren-Datenbank ETH (Gugerli, 2004). The geographical distribution of
origin and destination is displayed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2.2 Incomes
To calculate the income differentials, which could potentially trigger a migration
decision, we use the fixed part of the professors’ income. The motivation for
this choice is the income structure: the income sources were the basic salary, the
enrolment fees (Kollegiengelder) and the examination fees (e.g. Ringer, 1990, p.
37). Since the flexible part of the income was to a large extent dependent on the
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Figure 3.3: Professors at ETH 1855-1933: Origin and Destination
Origin
Destination
Data source: Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (1955,
p. 226-254), Gugerli (2004)
attractivity of the courses offered, the number of students enrolled9, as well as to
exogenous determinants such as a war, the fixed part can be seen as an important
“safety net” determined in the negotiations with the university.
For the duration analysis later on, we restrict the sample to end in 1913,
although the data on the professors would allow an analysis until 1933. The reason
is that we want to avoid dealing with the turmoils caused by the First World War,
the hyperinflation in Germany and the outbreak of the Great Depression. All in
all, the period after 1913 is characterized by a severe reduction in the number of
foreign professors in Zurich.
9At least initially, during the founding years, student numbers at UZH and ETH were still low,
so that the low fixed income could hardly be compensated by the flexible part.
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Teaching at the UZH started in spring term 1833, with 7 full professors (Moser,
2011, Vol. I, p. 1-4) and 161 students (HSSO, Table Z.14a). The university was
founded by cantonal law on September 28, 1832. The teaching load was fixed at
12 hours per week for full professors and 5 hours for associate professors. The
law set the annual salary of full professors to 2625 Fr. (Erziehungsrat des Kantons
Zürich, 1938, p. 191), which was less than at the universities of Basle and Berne,
and soon turned out to be too low to attract foreign professors. This fact forced
the cantonal government to create a fund with the purpose to finance boni for
outstanding professors (Meyer, 1939, p. 29-43). Still, average income remained
low, but nevertheless, the political situation in Europe made Zurich attractive
for foreign professors: all of the 7 professors teaching in spring 1833 came from
Germany. Incidentally, the foundation of the UZH took place at the time, of the
failing liberal Vormärz struggles in the German states (1830-1848).
The ETH was founded by federal law on February 7, 1854. The plan was to hire
32 professors, with a budget of 103000 Fr. (69 per cent of the total budget), which
implies an average annual base income of 3200 Fr. (Eidgenössische Polytechnische
Komission, 1854, p. 92-93).10 Similarly to UZH, there was a fund to finance income
increases for outstanding professors. The budget had to be increased regularly
(1859, 1863, 1873, 1881, 1886, 1887, 1895, 1901),11 leading also to an increase in the
income of professors. The main argument in favor of income raises was always
the lack of competitivness with respect to comparable institutions in Germany
and Austria (e.g. Bundesrat 1887, p. 139-140, Bundesrat 1893, p. 362). Table
3.1 contains an overview on the development of annual incomes at UZH and
ETH. For UZH, we calculated annual average incomes of professors based on
the expenditure data reported in Meyer (1939). For ETH, the data come from
the federal budget,12 and, if not available, from the minutes of the supervisory
authority in charge of the technical universities (Schulrat).13 The deflator comes
10It was planned to hire seven outstanding full professors, at an annual income of 4000 Fr.,
and, in addition, four part-time professors with an annual income of 2000 Fr.. The remaining
21 professors should get an annual income of 3200 Fr.. The commission was not sure about
the competitiveness of the proposed salaries (Eidgenössische Polytechnische Komission, 1854, p.
92-93).




from Studer and Schuppli (2008, Table A-2, p. 151-152).
Table 3.1: Annual Income (Fixed Part) of Full Professors in Zurich, 1833-1913
UZH ETH













Sources: Meyer (1939, p. 29-63), Eidgenössische Polytechnische Komis-
sion (1854, p. 92-93), Bundesrat (1859, p. 69), Bundesrat (1863, p. 972),
Bundesrat (1873, p. 1020-1021), Bundesrat (1893, p. 381)
What was the position of a typical professor’s income in the income distribu-
tion for public servants in the canton of Zurich at the time? The data reported
in Meyer von Knonau (1844, 1846, Vol. 2, p. 269) allow a comparison of pro-
fessors’ incomes with the income of employees of the adminstriation and judicial
authority in Zurich around 1846. The distribution is based on 125 individuals,
with an average income of 1060 Fr. and a median income of 595 Fr.. Table 3.2
shows that a full professor obtained the maximum income possible (the same as
the two mayors and the two presidents of the court, see Meyer von Knonau 1844,
1846, Vol. 2, p. 269, fn. 1), while an associate professor earned an income close to
the 75 per cent quantile. The income of the full professor was 342 per cent above
median, while for the associate professor, the difference was 96 per cent.
Compared to other public servants in the canton, professors were obviously
well paid, especially if we take into account that the figures discussed here are
only the fixed part of the income. But for the decision to stay or leave Zurich the
potential alternative income at a foreign university was also important. Between
1810 and 1945, Berlin (Königlich Preussische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin,
founded 1810) is seen as the outstanding German university, followed by Munich
and Leipzig (Baumgarten, 1997, p. 224-225, 265-266). In our data, a total of 6
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Table 3.2: Administration and Judicial Authority in Zurich: Income Distribution
around 1846 (Fr.)
Administration UZH
Maximum 2625 Full Professor 2625
75 Per Cent Quantile 1165 Associate Professor 1167
Median 595
25 Per Cent Quantile 471
Minimum 365
Sources: Meyer (1939, p. 29-63), Meyer von Knonau (1844, 1846,
Vol. 2, p. 269)
professors left Zurich for Berlin (UZH: 5, ETH: 1),14 which is 7 per cent of the total
number leaving. Moreover, the maps with the destinations in Figures 3.2 and
3.3 show that there is a wide dispersion of destinations across German speaking
regions. The figures in Table 3.3 indicate that there is a positive correlation between
the ranking of universities and attractivity for Zurich professors as measured by
the number of professors hired from Zurich, at least for the UZH. For the ETH,
the relationship is not clear. We decided to use average incomes of German
14This does not include the technical university (TH Berlin), the business school (Handelshoch-
schule Berlin), and the Kaiser-Wilhelms-Institut. In total, 10 professors left Zurich for Berlin.
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Table 3.3: Destinations: University Ranking
Ranking Attractivity
Science Arts UZH ETH
Berlin 1 1 3 4
Munich 2 2 2 4
Leipzig 3 3 6 4
Bonn 4 4 5 5
Heidelberg 5 5 1 4
Göttingen 6 6 6 2
Halle 7 7 3 4
Strassburg 8 8 5 3
Tübingen 9 9 3 3
Würzburg 10 10 3 1
Breslau 11 11 3 5
Freiburg 12 12 2 4
Marburg 13 13 4 4
Jena 14 15 5 4
Königsberg 15 14 5 3
Kiel 16 16 8 5
Giessen 17 17 4 5
Erlangen 18 18 6 5
Greifswald 19 19 7 5
Rostock 20 20 8 5
Sources: Baumgarten (1997, p. 224-225, 265-266),
Erziehungsrat des Kantons Zürich (1938, p. 960-
1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983, p. 665-
748), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (1955,
p. 226-254), Gugerli (2004). Note that the list of
German universities does not include technical uni-
versities and business schools.
professors from the University of Bonn (Königlich Preussische Rheinische Friedrich-
Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn) based on the individual data reported in Maus
(2013, p. 311-366) as comparison. This university was in a similar situation, in
the sense that it was not yet fully established. Re-founded in 1818 to strengthen
the Prussian influence in the Catholic and Francophile Rhineland (Charle, 2004,
p. 34), the university had to hire professors from abroad, since it could not draw
from a local pool (Baumgarten, 1997, p. 168-169, 234). In terms of ranking, it was
considered as directly following the top universities Berlin, Munich, and Leipzig
(Table 3.3),15 hence, it can be seen as an example for an attractive alternative to
Zurich. For the German time series, we used Desai (1968)16 as deflator. The data
15See Lexis (1904, p. 336-340) and Titze (1995, p. 96-97) for a brief overview on the history.
16Desai, Ashok V., (1968 [2005]) Reallöhne in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1913. GESIS Köln,
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for Bonn are not available before 1841, therefore, our sample has to be restricted
to 1841-1913.
We follow Williamson (1995) to make the real income series internationally



















; j = UZH,ETH, (3.1)
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is the real income ratio for base
year 0. To obtain the income ratio, we take German retail prices for 1910 re-
ported in Hoffmann (1965, Tables 141, 142, 143, p. 574-591) and retail prices for
Zurich (HSSO, Table H.27) in the same year, and calculate PPP based on a Zurich
consumer basket17 to express the Bonn income in Swiss francs.
















; j = UZH,ETH. (3.2)
The results are displayed in Figure 3.4. Up until 1890 for the ETH and 1900
for the UZH, the incomes in Zurich are clearly below what professors could
have earned in a German university as represented by Bonn, with an income
differential of about 40 to 50 percentage points.18 This outcome already points
towards the importance of non-economic factors explaining the length of service
of full professors at Zurich.
Deutschland ZA8216 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.
17The consumer basket is for a middle class family with two children in the period 1883-1910
(Duttweiler, 1915). We take average expenditure shares for 1899-1910 to smooth out irregular
annual fluctuations.
18This finding is in line with the international real wage indices presented by Studer (2008, p.
450, Figure 10): Swiss wages are clearly below the other countries in the sample (Germany, Spain,
France, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands), which is, to some extent, a result of the backward
projection method applied (Studer, 2008, p. 428). However, Studer’s results show that Swiss
wages were low in the 19th Century.
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Figure 3.4: Real Income Indices, 1833-1913 (Full Professors)


















































The data are smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick
and Prescott, 1997) with a smoothing weight of 100.
3.3 Methodology
The anecdotal evidence presented in this paper points to the importance of polit-
ical events for the migration decision, against the background of a high propensity
to leave due to integration problems for German professors. To quantify the de-
terminants of length of service, we model the spells of full professors from Ger-
many and Switzerland at UZH and ETH for the observation period 1833-191319
in terms of survival analysis and apply a proportional hazards model.20 For the
survival analysis we only include professors of Swiss or German nationality. Leav-
19Data on the income gap is available from 1841-1913.
20See e.g. Winkelmann and Boes (2006, p. 251-278).
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ing UZH or ETH to take up employment at a university outside of Switzerland is
coded as the failure event. The hazard rate λ(t|x jt) for an individual professor is
defined as




;λ0(t) > 0, (3.3)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard of leaving UZH or ETH for employment
abroad21, and x jt is a vector containing individual specific explanatory variables
varying over time. To facilitate parameter interpretation, we calculate hazard
ratios as















The vector x jt contains a dummy indicating whether the professor was Ger-
man or employed at ETH. Various dummies indicating whether a professor was
employed in Zurich over certain time periods are included. The observations for
each professor are made up of the semesters employed in Zurich. Event dummies
can thus be defined up to semesters to allow for the accurate specification of time
and event dummies.
This allows us to specify political turmoil dummies indicating, for example,
whether political events such as 1848/49, the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the
Franco-Prussian War and Unification (1871), the Kulturkampf (culture struggle,
1871-1879), and the Sozialistengesetz (Anti-Socialist Laws, 1879-1890) took place
during a semester in which a professor was at risk to leave Zurich for academic
employment abroad. The political dummy is supposed to measure events lead-
ing to discontent among the liberal/national groups. The Austro-Prussian War
resulted in the establishment of Prussian Hegemony and the Kleindeutsche Lösung
(Lesser German Solution) of the German Question by the exclusion of the Austrian
empire. At the same time, the re-orientation of the liberal parties towards sup-
porting the policy of Bismarck was interpreted as an opportunistic compromise
by more principled progressives (e.g. Nipperdey, 1983, p. 790-803).
21We choose to define the failure event as professor leaving Zurich for employment at a univer-
sity outside of Switzerland, because we want to explore the phenomenon of German expatriates
choosing against staying in Switzerland after experiencing the Tonhalle Riots as an anti-German
event. Note also, that in the vast majority of cases the alternative employment chosen by an
German professor in Zurich is a German university.
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For the time after 1871, which turned out to become a focal point of this project,
there are a number of influences, some in opposing directions, to be expected: On
the one hand, the unification led to excitement among German nationalists in
Zurich and implied a larger labour market for academics, with new universities
founded, especially technical universities, over the course of the following years.
Moreover, it led to an already mentioned increase in anti-German feelings in the
Swiss public. On the other hand, the turmoils of the Kulturkampf and the campaign
against the Social Democratic Party created an oppressive climate in Germany.22
All in all, the estimated parameters for a given time period have to be interpreted
as measuring a combination of the different push and pull effects in Zurich as well
as in the German states at the time. Since the Tonhalle Riots were so appalling to
the local German expatriates23, we are confident that this event had a strong push
effect.
In addition to the political dummy, the vector x j contains the average income
gap25 during a given semester. To allow for the possibility that mobility is age
dependent, it also contains the age and age-squared of the professor during his
semester in Zurich. The spell of professors dying in Zurich and moving on to
other Swiss universities are treated as right-censored.
3.4 Results
How do the characteristics of professors hired at Zurich compare to those hired
by German universities? The data collected in Baumgarten (1997) allow such a
22In his autobiography, Sieveking [1935] (1977, p. 104) quotes the letter of a friend, complaining
about the “Kasernenluft” (barracks atmosphere) in Germany.
23Again we refer to qualitative evidence to substantiate this claim: Otto Benndorf, professor for
archeology, quit his professorship in Zurich explicitly because of anti-German sentiment to take
up unpaid employment in Munich. Former UZH rektor Adolf Gusserow, who was part of the
organizing committee of the Tonhalle festivities left Zurich as did the non-academic but influential
committee member, affluent banker and patron of the arts, Otto Wesendonck. Gottfried Semper,
founding father of the architectural school at ETH left Zurich, as did the law professor Adolf
Exner (both members of the committee). Urner mentions other professors leaving Zurich at the
time, among them the law professor Alfred Boretius, who was in opposition with local democratic
traditions, and others who might have left Zurich mostly for reasons related to family and health,
but all in all the 24 and their aftermath were experienced as a blow among the German expatriates
in Zurich, some of whom had built up the fledgling academic instutions and belonged to the
most accomplished scientists, artists and business men living in Zurich at the time(Urner, 1976, p.
221-222).
25The income gap is calculated as ratio of the two real income indices (Williamson, 1995, p. 177).
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comparison for the arts and science faculty in the periods 1815(1833)-1847, 1848-
1879, and 1880-1913. The data displayed in Figure 3.5 show the average age at
entry, the average length of service, the proportion of individuals hired from a full
professor position, and the proportion of professors leaving. The average age at
entry and the proportion of full professors hired measures at which stage of their
career professors were hired at the institution in question, while length of service
and the proportion of professors leaving reflects the ability of the institution
to retain researchers with an option to leave. The German universities for which
data are available are Giessen and Kiel as examples for small universities typically
hiring professors at the start of the career, Heidelberg and Göttingen as medium
size universities, and Munich and Berlin as examples for top German institutions,
which hired typically professors at a more advanced stage of their career.
Baumgarten (1997, p. 182) characterizes the UZH as “entry-level university”
(Einstiegsuniversität), following the assessment by Laspeyres (1882). This would
make the UZH comparable to Giessen and Kiel, but Figure 3.5 shows that this is
not straightforward. For the period 1815 (1833)-184726, age at entry is closer to the
top universities, while for the later periods, both faculties look more similar to the
faculties from the small German universities. The length of service stays almost
constant over the three periods and does not allow a clear-cut classification for the
UZH. In terms of share of full professors hired, the arts faculty is not successful
compared with the German universities, while the science faculty is clearly more
successful, apart from the period 1880-1913. The proportion of professors leaving
the UZH is higher than for the top German universities over all three periods.
Table 3.4 contains the results for the UZH by faculty (theology, law, medi-
cine, arts, science) and the ETH. The age at entry is about the same for the two
universities, but the share of full professors hired is much higher for the ETH,
while length of service is longer. There are also less professors leaving the ETH
compared to the UZH.
An illustrative example for the characteristics of professors hired at Zurich
before 1913 and their motivation to migrate are the economists. We zoom in on this
26This time period is congruent with the Vormärz, an era of mostly failing liberal and nationalist
struggles in the German states.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of UZH Faculties with German Universities






































































































UZH Giessen Kiel Heidelberg Goettingen Munich Berlin
Data source: Baumgarten (1997, p. 291-295), Erziehungsrat des Kantons Zürich
(1938, p. 960-1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983, p. 665-748)
group, which we have studied more closely, in order to validate and contextualize
the quantitative findings for the complete sample of full professors below. Among
them were well known scholars: Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878), Victor Böhmert
(1829-1918), Julius Wolf (1862-1937), and Heinrich Herkner (1863-1932). For some
of them, political events triggered the migration decision: Hildebrand, the co-
founder of the Older Historical School in Germany, had to flee from Germany as
a consequence of his political activities during the 1848 revolution. He stayed at
UZH from 1851 to 1855, and left for Bern, where he taught from 1855 to 1861.
Böhmert, co-founder of the volkswirtschaftlicher Kongress,27 taught at UZH from
27The free-trade pre-decessor of the Verein für Socialpolitik was founded in 1858, see Böhmert
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Professors Hired at UZH and ETH
UZH
I II III IV V Total ETH
Age at Entry (Years)
1833-1847 32.0 32.9 35.9 40.7 45.3 35.6
1848 (1855)-1879 37.9 37.9 37.1 37.4 38.4 37.6 37.8
1880-1913 41.8 36.1 40.0 42.5 38.8 39.7 37.8
Length of Service (Years)
1833-1847 20.3 6.4 6.5 17.0 15.7 11.8
1848 (1855)-1879 17.6 12.9 11.9 15.5 16.1 14.1 18.5
1880-1913 18.8 14.7 17.2 15.4 19.4 17.0 20.8
Full Professors Hired
1833-1847 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 33.3% 10.3%
1848 (1855)-1979 0.0% 25.0% 15.0% 4.8% 33.3% 15.1% 32.9%
1880-1913 0.0% 5.9% 19.0% 10.0% 5.3% 9.2% 19.4%
Professors Leaving
1833-1847 42.9% 62.5% 75.0% 33.3% 33.3% 55.2%
1848 (1855)-1879 42.9% 45.0% 56.5% 50.0% 25.0% 46.4% 27.8%
1880-1913 20.0% 52.9% 33.3% 30.0% 26.3% 33.3% 19.4%
I: Theology, II: Law, III: Medicine, IV: Arts, V: Science. Data source: Erziehungsrat
des Kantons Zürich (1938, p. 960-1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983, p.
665-748), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (1955, p. 226-254), Gugerli (2004).
1866 to 1874 (joint appointment with the ETH). According to his autobiography,
he could not feel comfortable any more in Zurich after 1871/72, when public
oppinion turned against Germans as a consequence of the victory of Prussia over
France and the unification of Germany(See Böhmert (1900, p. 42)).28
Herkner (at UZH from 1898 to 1907) is probably best known for his book on the
labor question (Die Arbeiterfrage, 1894), which saw eight editions. He left Zurich
for Berlin, where in 1913, he was hired as successor of Gustav von Schmoller (1838-
1917), the head of the Younger Historical School. From 1917 to 1929, he served
as president of the Verein für Socialpolitik.29 Wolf, who taught as full professor at
UZH from 1889-1897, is usually known as supervisor of the doctoral dissertation
(1900); Hentschel (1975).
28The hostilities in Zurich culminated in the so-called Tonhallekrawall from March 9, 1871, a
violent protest against the celebration of the unification and victory organized by Germans (Urner,
1976, p. 207-222).
29For Herkner, see his autobiography (Herkner in Meiner 1924, p.77-116) and Backhaus and
Hanel (1994). Herkner’s doctoral dissertation on the cotton industry in Upper Alsace (1887) was
supervised by Lujo Brentano (1844-1931), another important member of the Younger Historical
School, and deemed as influential enought to cause a three years lasting quarrel between Brentano
and Schmoller (Brentano 1917, p. 92-102, Brentano 1931, p. 126-129, 134-135, Backhaus and Hanel
1994, p. 47-53).
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of Rosa Luxemburg, but wrote an (at the time) widely discussed critique of social-
ism (System der Sozialpolitik, 1892) and campaigned for an economic unification of
Europe (Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein).30 The fact that Herkner and Wolf are
honorably mentioned by Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis (Schum-
peter [1954] 1984, p. 765, 947, 1076-1077) is also evidence for the standing of
professors at Zurich. In their autobiographies, both Herkner and Wolf comment
on the integration problems of German academics into the Swiss society, which
made the decision to leave Zurich easier.31
None of the full professors in economics hired before 1913 stayed at the UZH,
but left after an average of 6 years.32 This is different for the ETH: here, the
average length of service of full professors in economics was 19.4 years. This
difference can be attributed to the fact that there are no Swiss among the economics
professors at UZH. As can be seen from Figure 3.6, this result is typical across all
disciplines at the two universities over the entire observation period 1833 (1855)-
1933. For a display of how attrition rates of German and Swiss professors at
both institutions in Zurich evolved over time refer to Figure 3.733. Again, there
is a clear difference between Swiss and German professors. German professors
exhibit a much higher rate of attrition than the natives. Note also, that the linear
trend indicates convergence over the the period of observation: Swiss professors
become more mobile to consider alternative employment abroad and German
professors more likely to stay in Switzerland.
The results from the survival analysis are displayed in Tables 3.5 to 3.8. Without
highlighting any specific time periods, the results in Table 3.5 report the hazard
ratios for the available covariates. As would be expected from the evidence in
Figure 3.6 and 3.7, the results in column 1 show that being German raises the
probability of leaving Zurich for employment abroad. For the specifications in
30On Wolf, see his autobiography (Wolf in Meiner 1924, p. 209-247) and Kiesewetter (2008).
31See Herkner in Meiner (1924, p. 103), Wolf in Meiner (1924, p. 213), and Urner (1976) for a
general overview covering the period until the First World War.
32The average increases to 7 years if we include Heinrich Sieveking (at UZH from 1907-1921).
But according to the epilogue in his autobiography, Sieveking was effectively on leave from
autumn 1916 on (Ahrens in Sieveking [1935] 1977, p. 115).
33Note the singular peak attrition exceeding 13% among German professors in the fall semesters
of 1871 and 1872: In spring of 1870, 36 Germans are employed as full professors. Between the
spring semester of 1870 and 1872, 11 German professors have left (almost 20% of all full professors
employed in Zurich at the UZH and ETH in 1870).
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Only full professors; data source: Erziehungsrat des Kantons
Zürich (1938, p. 960-1001), Rektorat der Universität Zürich (1983,
p. 665-748), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (1955, p. 226-
254)
column 1, 5 and 6 the baseline hazard increases by a factor between 2 and 3.
The size of the effect is robust to different specifications. There seems to be an
institutional difference between ETH and UZH in their ability to retain academic
talent, which was already reflected in the figures presented in Table 3.4.34 A
professor at ETH is about half as likely to leave Switzerland for employment
abroad. This finding and the size of the effect is robust over different specifications
34Note, however, that the observations for the ETH professors start only in 1855 and that the
hazard of German professors is generally lower in the second half of the time span as reported in
3.6.
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Figure 3.7: Attrition of German and Swiss Professors per Semester
and holds even when the income gap35, which accounts for the differences in the
wage level between ETH and UZH, is included as a control (see column 2, 5 and
6). The coefficient for the income gap is statistically significant and points into
the expected direction for the model in column 3: if the wage level at the German
reference university is twice as high as at the UZH or ETH in Zurich, the hazard
increases by 50% compared to the baseline. Note, however, that the size of the
effect drops to zero when the German-dummy and the ETH-dummy are included
in columns 5 and, additionaly, age and age-squared in column 6.36
Furthermore, we can control for the age of professors. To capture non-
linearities, a quadratic term is included in the specification. Columns 4 and 6
show that the effect for age is robust even when the other covariates are included
In order to interpret the captured non-linearity, note that the corresponding point
estimates for the underlying coefficients in column 6 are -.2604167 for the linear
and .0025069 for the quadratic term, setting the first derivative of the effect equal
35The income gap is calculated as ratio of the two real income indices (Williamson, 1995, p. 177).
36Testing the interaction of the income gap with the German-dummy does not reject the null as
long as a German-dummy is included in the specification.
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Table 3.5: Hazard Ratios for Germans, ETH, Incomegap and Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GER 2.806∗∗∗ 2.706∗∗∗ 2.536∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ETH 0.511∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)






N 9063 9063 8799 9063 8799 8799
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
to zero yields an age of 52 years as the minimum of the quadratic function: up
to an age of 52 years, a professor’s hazard of leaving Zurich falls and after that it
increases at an increasing rate. Above, we have characterized UZH as an entry-
level university and observed that entry-age at ETH was similar. This finding is
in line with career paths of junior professors who start their careers in Zurich.
Those who do not leave early for a university abroad tend to stay for a significant
share of their productive years and move on to better posts as they reach the peak
of their professional lives. None of these covariates need to be interpreted as
causal for the purposes of this project. Instead, they will serve as control variables
for the estimates in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, when we identify the effect of sharply
discontinuous and narrowly defined political events.
As a next step in our survival analysis, we let the data determine how the
hazard from being German has evolved over time compared to the baselinze
hazard of Swiss professors in Zurich. The hazard ratios are reported for the
interaction term between the time period and being a German professor. We
begin by slicing the data in smaller and smaller intervals. The results presented
in Table 3.6 report the hazard for two (column 1), three (column 2), four intervals
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(column 3) and for decades in column 4. Compared to the baseline hazard of
being Swiss, they display the increased hazard of being German over time. The
results are in line with the point estimate of 2.8 reported for the German-dummy
in column 1 of Table 3.5. They reveal, that the hazard of German professors
leaving was higher during the first half of the period of observation.
Table 3.6: German Hazards over Time I



































N 9063 9063 9063 9063
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation
TDs are interacted with GER-dummy
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In order to tease out possible discontinuities in the data we slice the data even
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further to account for 5-year intervals in Table 3.7. In Table 3.7 column 1 we
report the results again without the set of controls to cover the maximum time
span.37 Looking through the results in chronological order it is again apparent
that the hazard of German professors drops over the course of the 19th century
as was found in the estimates reported in Table 3.6. Interestingly, with the finer
slicing of 5-year intervals, two episodes stand out: First, observe that the generally
very high hazard of German professors sharply drops to the level of their Swiss
colleagues for the period of 1845-1850. This coincides with turmoil and failing
liberal revolutions in the German states 1848/49, that were identified as the causes
for many liberal and progressively minded German professors to seek refuge in
Zurich. The second discontinuity is to highlight that towards the end of the 19th
century, when the hazard of German professors more and more approaches the
level of their Swiss colleagues, rises again for the period of 1870-1875 to a level
that is only topped by the German hazard rate that is reported for 1840-1845 at
the beginning of observations. The period of 1870-1875 coincides with the anti-
German sentiments that culminated in the Tonhalle Riots and the new opportunities
for academics in the newly found German empire as outlined above.
As a robustness test for the identification of these sharply discontinuous epis-
odes we now include the full set of control variables38 and report the results in
Table 3.7 column 2. Again, the point estimates for 1845-1850 yield a small hazard
rate - the smallest for all the reported time periods. The hazard rate reported for
1870-1875, on the other hand is now the highest hazard rate reported for any of
the covered periods.
The tests reported in Table 3.7 let the data determine how the hazard of the
German professors changes over time. The foreign German professors are more
mobile than the native Swiss professors. We observe a general trend with the
Germans and their Swiss colleagues slowly converging in terms of attrition rates
towards the end of the 19th century. The periods of 1845-1850 as well as 1870-1875
stand out, with 1845-1850 indicating a very low hazard and 1870-1875 indicating
a very high hazard. Furthermore, these periods coincide with events identified in
37Income data only becomes available from 1841 onwards.
38Note, that now we exclude all observations before 1841, for which income data is not available.
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∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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our qualitative analysis of biographies of German professors and in the histori-
ographic literature.
In a last iteration, we use this information to pinpoint the timing of the events
which we suspect to be causal and report the results in 3.8. For convenience of
reference to what we have found for our controls, we report the results from Table
3.5 column 6 again in column 1 of Table 3.8. In columns 2 to 4 we now include the
political turmoil dummy 1848-1850 for the failed liberal revolution in Germany
and a political turmoil dummy 1871-1872 for the Tonhalle Riots. Note, that instead
of fully specifying all other time periods interacted with the German-dummy, we
include instead a German-dummy to control for the difference in hazards between
Swiss and German professors in the sample as a whole. The point estimates and
their corresponding hazard ratios suggest that the hazard for a German professor
to leave Zurich for employment outside of Switzerland increased by a factor of
three in the aftermath of the Tonhalle Riots and that this German-specific hazard
dropped sharply for the period of the failed liberal revolutions in Germany.
As pointed out above, the ETH and UZH lost about 20% of their full professors
within two years after the Tonhalle Riots. It must have been problematic for the
management of ETH and Zurich to deal with the sudden increase in fluctuation
and to find suitable replacements at such short notice. In Table 3.9 we present data
on the entry-age of hired professors and on the share of full professors recruited
(as opposed to initial appointments) over three consecutive 5-year periods from
1866-1880. We find that the age of entry remains stable for the UZH hires but
drops temporarily during 1871-1875 for the ETH and recovers later. The share
of full professors hired in this period drops at both institutions for the period of
1871-1875 and recovers partially in 1876-1880. We interpret this as evidence, that
ETH and UZH - at least temporarily - had to resort to hiring more junior faculty
members in order to fill the vacancies left by the high attrition among German
professors after the Tonhalle Riots. It stands to reason that replacing 20 per cent
of the faculty with comparatively less accomplished professors (if younger age
and initial appointments are taken as an indicator) may have had negative long
term consequences for the institutional development of UZH and ETH beyond
the five-year period in which recruiting success dropped.
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Table 3.8: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GER 2.536∗∗∗ 2.385∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ETH 0.502∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INC 1.006 0.982 1.046 1.017
(0.972) (0.915) (0.794) (0.923)
AGE 0.771∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AGE2 1.003∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗





N 8799 8799 8799 8799
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation
TDs are interacted with GER-Dummy
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: The Aftermath of the Tonhalle Riots
1865-1870 1871-1875 1876-1880
UZH
Entry-Age 36 36 36
% Full Professors Hired 67% 35% 54%
ETH
Entry-Age 35 33 38
% Full Professors Hired 67% 20% 33%
3.5 Conclusion
In 2011, professors in Switzerland earned more on average than professors in
any other country: 78 per cent more than professors in neighboring Germany, 35
per cent more than their colleagues in Britain and 55 per cent more than at US-
American universities (NZZ, 20.05.2012). On average, professors in Switzerland
have financially favorable conditions. This was not the case in the 19th Century,
when Switzerland was still among the poorer countries in Europe, which is also
reflected in the salaries the universities were able to pay. Swiss universities at the
time could benefit from the turbulent situation in Germany in terms of attracting
and retaining highly qualified researchers to build the fledgling UZH and ETH.
In the period under study, Zurich was both considered a safe haven by refugee
academics from abroad as well as a place to be fled for xenophobic outrage at
different times. For two landmark events, the failed liberal revolutions in the
German states in 1848/49 and the Tonhalle Riots, we find that political turmoil
mattered greatly in either keeping professors from leaving or giving them reasons
to leave. This finding holds for a survival analysis applying a proportional hazards
model to the complete set of full professors employed at UZH and ETH and the
inclusion of several controls, including the income gap. Whereas the German
expatriate professors were much more at risk to leave the university of Zurich
for academic employment outside of Switzerland in general, they were not more
likely to leave during the political turmoil of the failed liberal revolutions and
were much more likely to leave in the aftermath of the anti-German Tonhalle Riots.
These findings have to be taken with a grain of salt, on the one hand, we cannot
control for unobserved variables that make either foreign universities or Zurich
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more or less attractive, on the other hand, the precise timing of the events make
us confident that we have indeed estimated an effect that is at least partly driven
by the highlighted events. Moreover, we also find that the income gap (wages
at UZH and ETH were much lower than at a comparable university in Germany
initially and converged only slowly) did not matter in determining the duration
of employment spells during the period under study. This finding emphasizes
the main finding, of how important the incidence of political turmoil was relative
to the income gap. Moreover, we present evidence, that both UZH and ETH hired
more junior faculty to replace the missing professors than they hired before and
several years after the Tonhalle Riots.
Although the 19th century events portrayed here cannot be compared to cur-
rent situations in Switzerland and abroad, they are part of our collective historical
experience and contribute to how we frame what we observe today. The quantitat-
ive analysis shows that the concerns raised by our contemporaries in Switzerland,
today, were in principle valid for the period that we have studied: Political tur-
moil and social developments that are considered by expatriates as xenophobic
have had substantial impact on the recruitment and retention of faculty at UZH
and ETH in the 19th Century - even when differences in salary were large, they
have not mattered as much.
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Chapter 4
Long Run Effect of District-Based
versus License-Based Hunting on
Roe Deer Populations in 20th
Century Switzerland
4.1 Introduction
One class of problems studied in institutional economics relates to the manage-
ment of open-access resources. These are resources that, on the one hand, cannot
be effectively excluded from being used by others, and, on the other hand, di-
minish in quality the more they are used. In the language of economics, these
resources are non-excludable and rivalrous (Samuelson, 1954). Such properties
make them prone to degradation through excessive use. In a completely world,
say an unregulated open-access regime, the negative externalities imposed by
harvesting on other users, contemporaneously and in the future, are not taken
into account in the current period. The contemporaneous externality involves the
overcommitment of resources to harvesting. In the case of hunting this overcom-
mitment could be, for example, too many hunters, too many cars, too many dogs,
too much effort committed to a hunting area. As a result, hunters in open-access
regimes get a lower rate of return for their hunting efforts. The future extern-
ality is borne by hunters in the next hunting season because excessive hunting
will have lowered the stock of huntable game animals in the next period. There-
fore, the open-access regime results in over-exploitation and lower net returns for
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hunters in the long run.1 Since Hardin (1968), the economic literature has coined
the term Tragedy of the Commons for this concern. Looking back on the past 100
years of publications in the American Economic Review Stavins (2011) holds that
the problem of managing the commons has still not been solved in many con-
texts and that the search for solutions is more timely than ever. With economic
and population growth, our concerns with carrying capacity and environmental
quality have become ever more pressing. His survey includes a recent discussion
of examples and current challenges in our understanding. The over-fishing of
open-access fisheries is a relatively well-examined one.
A related example, the one that is studied here in the 20th century Swiss
context, is over-hunting of game populations.2 This issue of excessive exploitation
of the resource persists and emerges in other contexts, too, including problems
with pollution and global warming. Economists often recommend to assign
private property rights in order to ensure efficiency of use. There is a strong
theoretical case for the privatization of the renewable resource: the sole owner will
only employ such effort in the current period as is warranted by his returns and
he will balance his current harvest value against the asset value of the resource.3
The costs of proper privatization, however, for some of these resources can be
prohibitive. On a more positive note, Elinor Ostrom’s research on institutions4
has revolved around local solutions that have ameliorated the commons problem
through the development of institutions and informally overcoming problems of
collective action (at least partly) even when privatization was not implemented
(1990 and 2010).
In the case of hunting regulation in Switzerland, we can observe important
changes across cantons and time, and also, a pronounced dichotomy of funda-
mentally different institutions that has emerged: the license-based regime (LBR)
1The original finding in the literature goes back to Gordon (1954), for a textbook exposition
refer e.g. to Tietenberg and Lewis (2012, p. 328).
2The problem of open-access fisheries management is very closely related to open-access game
populations: it is hard to exclude other users from harvesting and users impose negative extern-
alities on each other. An important difference, however, is that game populations also impose
negative externalities on agriculture and forestry (Kaegi, 1911, p. 14), which makes it harder to
determine and to sustain the socially optimal population level.
3The original finding goes back to Scott (1955), for a textbook exposition refer e.g. to Tietenberg
and Lewis (2012, p. 329).
4For which she has received the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.
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and the district-based regime (DBR). This dichotomy and changes in the period
of observation will be exploited for the empirical strategy. To illustrate the insti-
tutional context some historic background is in order: under the Ancien Régime
the use of game populations for hunting was an exclusive privilege held by local
elites. This exclusivity prevented the stock of game animals to be over-hunted and
gave an incentive to the privileged classes to protect and foster game populations
looking forward. A considerable stock of game animals was preserved and could
be harvested sustainably.
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Napoleonic Era brought institu-
tions of the French Revolution to Switzerland, with considerable benefit for the
treated regions. The impact on Swiss wildlife was less benign: under the Helvetic
Republic, Swiss wildlife became the common property of the nation.5 Considered
a former privilege of the higher classes, hunting was opened for all citizen in
1800. The ensuing surge in unregulated hunting activity had immediate and
detrimental results for Swiss wildlife. To provide for a modicum of regulatory
control, the License-Based Regime (LBR) was introduced by the Helvetic Republic
in all cantons. The LBR allowed all citizens who paid the corresponding fee to
hunt anywhere in the canton. No privilege existed for landowners. Moreover,
it was ineffectively monitored, closed seasons and the protection of certain spe-
cies were not obeyed because they lacked virtually any effective enforcement.
Predictably, the stocks of huntable big game soon collapsed almost completely.
Big game like Red Deer, Wild Boar and Ibex became extinct with only scant and
scattered populations of Roe Deer and Chamois surviving. The historiographic
literature covering this period illustrates the Tragedy of the Commons mechanism
(e.g. Breitenmoser and Breitenmoser-Würsten (2008, p. 124-126) and Schmidt
(1956, p. 14-26)).
With the exception of Aargau, which was the first canton to introduce a District-
Based hunting regime (DBR) in 18036 when the cantons regained their sovereignty
5Note, that the inneralpine cantons had hunting rights for all free men, based on medieval law,
even under the Ancien Régime and, correspondingly, seriously depleted stocks of game all along.
These cantons typically adopted even the loosest of LBR regulations only after being forced to do
so by federal law in 1876 (Schmidt, 1976, p.134-139).
6The Canton Aargau adopted the LBR temporarily in 1837-1838, but has remained regulated
by the DBR ever since.
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in hunting matters, Swiss big game stocks did not recover until more effective and
better enforced regulation was introduced and continuously expanded towards
the end of the 19th century at the federal level, the 1875 Bundesgesetz über Jagd und
Vogelschutz and, subsequently, at the cantonal level (Blankenhorn, 2008).
Swiss cantons today know both the LBR (Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell
Ausserrhoden, Bern, Fribourg, Glarus, Graubünden, Jura, Neuchâtel, Nidwalden,
Obwalden, Schwyz, Ticino, Uri, Vaud, Valais, Zug) and the DBR (Aargau, Basel-
Landschaft, Basel-Stadt, Luzern, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Thurgau,
Zurich).7 Over time, nine cantons have permanently adopted the DBR. The last
adoptions of the DBR at the Cantonal level took place in 1941 in Luzern and 1950
in St. Gallen.8 Comparing the two regimes, the LBR is an - over time increasingly
regulated - open-access regime for all hunters in a canton, wheras, the DBR leases
the exclusive right to hunt to a local hunting club at the municipal level. In the
DBR, leases are over several years and typically perpetuated indefinitely. Thus,
local hunting rights are held privately as common-property by a small group in
the DBR. For game species, such as Roe Deer, that have relatively small home
ranges, lying within the borders of a typical hunting district, the local resource
becomes effectively privatized. On the continuum of open-access and common-
property regimes, the institutional change of switching from LBR to DBR is thus
interpreted as a substantial step from open-access to common-property, where
the self-limiting and preserving mechanisms that Ostrom (1990)9 found for small
local communities are much more likely to kick in.10
Reviewing trends in the literature in 1998, Deacon et al. (1998, p. 390-392)
7The Canton of Geneva abolished private hunting activities in 1974. All hunting and game
management activities are conducted by a specialised branch of the state bureaucracy (e.g. Bau-
mann et al. 2014).
8Mixed systems with the choice of the hunting system at the municipal level have existed for
transition periods over several years (e.g. Kurmann (1944, p. 49-55) and Steinmann (1950)).
9The conditions for long-enduring common property institutions are: 1. Clearly defined
boundaries, 2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, 3.
Collective-choice arrangements, 4. Monitoring, 5. Graduated sanctions, 6. Conflict resolution
mechanisms, 7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90).
10The use of this terminology is not completely homogeneous in the literature. Platteau (2008),
e.g. uses the terms open-access and common-property interchangeably. Other authors, like Stavins
(2011) differentiate between the two terms, defining common-property resources as being held by
a relatively small group with the option to exclude outsiders, whereas open-access resources are
those that are non-excludable. The latter differentiation of terms will be used for the purposes of
this project.
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Figure 4.1: Hunting Regimes in Switzerland
License-Based Regime (LBR)
District-Based Regime (DBR)
Switching from LBR to DBR
Bureaucratic Regime
Source: (Baumann et al., 2014, p.25).
have called for better empirical measurement of key relationships between insti-
tutions and the exploitation of renewable resources. In the meantime, at least one
landmark study has been undertaken, studying the differential impact of institu-
tions on fisheries with the toolbox of panel data econometrics, e.g.: Costello et al.
(2008). This study has shown, that fisheries that were managed with Individual
Tradable Quotas (ITQs) were less likely to collapse.11 The research project at hand
is another step in the direction of better empirical measurement and estimating
the size of the effect of institutional change as called for by Deacon et al. (1998)
looking at game management in Switzerland. To the best of my knowledge, such
econometric studies of specific institutional effects on population dynamics do
not exist for the effect of hunting regulations in the recent empirical economic
literature.
In the Swiss context a rudimentary study comparing the average of harvested
11ITQs “work by allocating a dedicated share of the scientifically determined total catch to
fishermen, communities, or cooperatives. This provides a stewardship incentive; as the fishery is
better managed, the value of the shares increases”(Costello et al., 2008, p. 1679).
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game animals from Swiss cantons, differentiating LBR and DBR, with figures from
Western Germany and Austria from 1954 to 1966 was undertaken by Blaupot ten
Cate (1968). And even in the relatively well-studied field of fisheries our under-
standing of different institutions is still scant and patchy. The study by Costello
et al. (2008), for example, works with a panel data set covering fisheries for dif-
ferent species all over the globe. A principal concern with such empirical studies
and the one at hand is selection bias: were the institutional changes implemented
where they were most likely to yield a benefit, or where conditions were improv-
ing anyways? Can these features be sufficiently controlled for by observables?
A salient feature of the study at hand, is that the observations are drawn for the
same species from an area of extraordinary geographic proximity in which funda-
mentally different institutions are applied. The geographic proximity, the study
of one species and the fact that all observations were drawn from the institutional,
social and cultural context of Switzerland makes it more likely, that explanatory
factors that are unobserved (e.g. the impact of climate change, changes in na-
tional legistlation, etc.) are relatively homogeneous for the observations of Roe
Deer in different cantons of Switzerland, compared to the the different species
of fish studied all across the scope in the cited landmark study for institutional
impact on fisheries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the data from the Federal
Hunting and Area Statistics as well as on the institutional background are presen-
ted in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the applied methodology. Section 4.4
presents the results of the transition from the LBR to the DBR on the Harvesting
Density of Roe Deer. Applying a fixed effects panel data model with a full set of
yearly time dummies and a specification that allows for a variety of functional
forms yields a time profile of the causal effect for the 50 years after the introduction
of the DBR. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Data
4.2.1 Federal Hunting and Area Statistics
This project draws on two main sources for data: first, the Federal Hunting
Statistics and, second, the Federal Area Statistics. The number of harvested Roe
Deer per canton is taken from the Federal Hunting Statistics for the period from
1933-2007. Yearly cantonal data for forested land from 1933-2007 is generated by
linear interpolation of the Federal Area Statistics of 1923-24, 1952, 1972, 1979-85,
1992-97 and 2004-09. Note that the share of forested land is time-varying and has
increased in many cantons as previously agricultural lands of low productivity
were reforested over time (See Figure 4.2 and 4.312). This is important, because
the number of taken Roe Deer per Canton is proportional to the available habitat.
Thus, the available habitat per canton is time-varying. A measure of harvest
density (HD), the number of harvested Roe Deer per 100 ha of forested land is
then used as the outcome variable (for the basic descriptive statistics refer to Table
4.1, for long run cantonal plots refer to Figure 4.4).
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for HD
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
HD 3.596 3.031 0 16.503 1962
Two cantons are excluded from the sample for all estimates: Geneva, because
it has chosen to organise hunting through a state bureaucracy in 1974 and the
Canton Ticino because of data issues up until the early 1990ies. Excluding Geneva
and Ticino also excludes two cantons that constitute the extreme West and South
of Switzerland, thus making assumptions about comparable geographical and
climate conditions across cantons more likely to hold. In the following, we first
justify the choice of the HD measure and then the choice of Roe Deer as an
indicator species.
Regarding the choice of the outcome variable, consider the difficulty of estim-
ating game population dynamics: wild animals are notoriously hard to count.
12Highlighting the development of cantonal forests in Luzern and St. Gallen compared to the
development of the aggregate of Swiss cantons to demonstrate that the baseline results presented
later are not driven by an unusual pattern in the data on forested land.
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Figure 4.2: Long Run Development of Cantonal Forests
Therefore, researchers have resorted to the use of hunting statistics as a proxy.
Ueno et al. (2014) observe that hunting statistics have frequently been used in
the literature, in particular, when it was the only proxy for population dynamics
available across sufficiently large areas and time periods. Looking at Norwegian
Moose populations across time and space for 16 regions from 1967-2005 (most
regions cover a time-span of roughly 20 years), the authors find that using the
number of harvested animals compares favorably to other proxies such as obser-
vational data and data from accidents with motor vehicles. According to Ueno
et al. (2014) HD was most closely related with the number of moose both within
and between areas and the only measure well-suitable for spatial comparisons.
But, they find it was prone to exaggerated temporal variation and tended to
overemphasize the growth and decline of populations.
With reference to Swiss hunting statistics Breitenmoser and Breitenmoser-
Würsten (2008, p. 164-165) argues that yearly hunting statistics also reflect short-
term variations of conditions that affect hunting or the population stocks, e.g. the
weather conditions during the hunting season or a harsh winter that decimated
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Figure 4.3: Cantonal Forests: Luzern and St. Gallen
the stocks. Both Ueno et al. (2014) and Breitenmoser and Breitenmoser-Würsten
(2008) mention that HD statistics are a delayed measure of population dynamics.
Delayed, for example, because the hunting authorities adjust the harvesting ob-
jectives for hunters based on their observations of increased or decreased stocks
with a time lag. Furthermore, Breitenmoser and Breitenmoser-Würsten (2008)
points out that in the medium run (5-10 years), rising HD could mean a reduction
of the population if higher harvest rates are mandated to achieve this objective.
In the long run, however, HD measures are argued to be good and valid proxies
for estimating the dynamics of a population. For the purposes of this project the
yearly cantonal data from the Federal Hunting Statistic are therefore considered
to be not only the best available, but also suitable proxies.
In order to compare the effect of cantonal hunting regimes across Switzerland
the analysis here is based on Roe Deer as an indicator species. This species was
chosen for several reasons: first, it is quantitatively the most important game
species for hunting in Switzerland, exceeding the number of harvested animals
for Chamois and Red Deer (see Figure 4.5). Second, it is a species with homeranges
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Figure 4.4: Long Run Development of Cantonal HDs for Roe Deer
that are small relative to the size of a hunting district. Therefore, the expected
impact of the DBR is expected to be much higher for a local game resource such
as Roe Deer, than for any of the other big game species.13 Third, it is a species
that exists in large numbers in all cantons. Excluding Geneva and Ticino, the HD
for Roe Deer was higher than for Red Deer in all cantons except Graubünden and
Valais, and higher than for Chamois in all cantons except for Glarus, Graubünden,
Nidwalden, Obwalden, Uri and Valais.
13Homeranges for Roe Deer are smaller than 100 ha in Switzerland (Baumann et al., 2014, p.
43). Other important big game species like Red Deer, Wild Boar and Chamois move around much
more and very often across the boundaries of hunting districts. Therefore, the introduction of
the DBR is not expected to have such effects on the increase these populations. For Red Deer,
for example, a local hunter in the DBR can still have the incentive to harvest a stag whenever he
legally encounters one in his district, because he usually cannot be sure, whether the stag will stay
in his area.
74
Figure 4.5: Long Run Development of Big Game
4.2.2 Institutional History
The introduction of the DBR was highly contentious, often postponed and some-
times temporarily reversed by popular vote.14 Broadly speaking, the administra-
tion was frequently interested in transition to the DBR which would allow them
to generate a higher revenues from fees15 and in cost reduction16 for game man-
agement. The financially less fortunate hunters under the LBR were concerned
they would loose access to their hunting grounds.17 Agricultural and forestry
interests were worried about increasing damage from higher stocks of game for
which the tenants of a hunting district have to pay under the DBR.18
It turned out, that the expectation of the administrations was right: within a
decade after introduction of the DBR at the cantonal level, the total income gen-
14In Zurich, for example, a law introducing the DBR was rejected by popular vote in 1906, 1917
and finally accepted in 1929. In 1936 a referendum initiated by the cantonal hunting association
to reintroduce the LBR was rejected (Baur, 1955, p. 1-5).
15See e.g. Maag (1915, p. 48) and Kurmann (1944, p. 50-51).
16See e.g. Dommer (1948, p. 30-31).
17See e.g. Dommer (1948, p. 28-29) and Maag (1915, p. 46).
18See e.g. Maag (1915, p. 47).
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erated from hunting increased by a factor of ca. 2.5 in Luzern (Kurmann, 1944, p.
54) and by ca. 3.5 in St. Gallen (Steinmann, 1950, p. 314). In Zurich, the income
from hunting grew by a factor of 4.2 from 1927 under the LBR until 1951 under
the DBR (Baur, 1955, p. 3-4). All of these observations are in line with the reading
that the transition from the LBR to the DBR was in effect a privatization of hunting
rights which internalised positive (increased yield, more hunting pleasure) and
negative externalities of higher stocks of game (game management and compens-
ation of damages). This rise in the fees generated fees is commensurate with the
two well-established findings in the economics of renewable resources: first, rent
dissipation under open-access (Gordon, 1954) and, second, to the finding, that
resources are optimally managed, when the owner balances the current harvest
value against the future asset value (Scott, 1955).
Consulting the historiographic literature, especially dissertations about can-
tonal and federal hunting law from the early 20th century, reveals that the accounts
for the historical development of the hunting regulations, notably the years for
the introduction, are somewhat contradictory. The most detailed accounts can
be found in dissertations covering the legal transition from the LBR to the DBR
on the cantonal level. Such detailed dissertations exist for the cases of Luzern
(Kurmann, 1944) and St. Gallen (Steinmann, 1950), which is crucial for this study,
because the institutional changes in these cantons are the basis for the empirical
strategy.19 They show not only the reversals, but also that the final introduction
of the DBR at the cantonal level was sometimes undertaken with an intermediate
step of offering the municipalities the option of introducing the DBR at the Mu-
nicipal level.20 This intermediate step is called facultative DBR in the literature.
In Luzern, the DBR was first introduced in 1810 but immediately afterwards the
LBR was reinstituted. In 1906, the cantonal executive wanted to introduce the fac-
19To my knowledge, such dissertations covering the institutional evolution are not available for
all cantons. Blanc (1930) covers Fribourg, Thürer (1979) Glarus and Jörimann (1926) Graubünden
in their dissertations. Good sources on the institutional history of Zurich are Baur (1955) and Maag
(1915). Sources on the evolution of Swiss hunting regulation can be found in the dissertations
of Kaegi (1911) who covers Swiss hunting law and Dommer (1948) who covers the DBR from a
Swiss perspective. A historical account of Swiss hunting is provided by Schmid (2010) and, with
an excellent overview on the choice of the hunting regime in different Cantons, by Schmidt (1976,
p. 128-158).
20Kurmann (1944, p. 52-54) and Steinmann (1950, p. 67-69, p. 167, p. 247-248 and p. 284).
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ultative DBR, in 1916 they proposed the introduction of the DBR at the cantonal
level - these were rejected by popular vote - finally, in 1930 the facultative DBR
passed a popular vote and most municipalities started switching to the DBR. In
St. Gallen, the introduction of the DBR was rejected by popular vote in 1896, 1909,
1927 and 1932. In 1935 it was instituted by the executive as a temporary measure
to finance the public deficit under provisions of emergency law during the Great
Depression.
These intermediate steps and the reversals explain the contradictory accounts
between sources that cover the development of hunting regulations of Swiss
hunting regulations at the federal level. For pinpointing the final transitions
to the DBR, this project relies on the two dissertations covering Luzern and St.
Gallen as well as on a survey among the cantonal hunting authorities undertaken
with the help of the Bundesamt für Umwelt (BAFU) (Bundesamt für Umwelt
(2015)). Regarding the final transitions in the 20th century and the historical
development of Luzern and St. Gallen the numbers should be accurate. For a
more thorough picture covering each canton’s history and to account for more
complex transitions, much more archival work would be required at the various
cantonal archives. Such work is beyond the current scope of this project. For
the purposes of this study, we consider only the latest and final adoptions of
the hunting regime. The other final adoptions of the DBR took place in 1838 in
Aargau, 1832 in Basel-Land, 1877 in Basel-Stadt, 1921 in Schaffhausen, 1932 in
Solothurn, 1930 in Thurgau and 1929 in Zurich.
Where available, the more detailed cantonal histories of hunting regimes show
that even when the DBR was introduced, this decision was sometimes reversed.
Even in cantons that had recently switched to the DBR, local hunters at the time
could not be sure, whether the canton would again switch back to the LBR.
Therefore, the effects on population dynamics that are measured here, are expected
to accrue over decades after the last final adoption of the DBR. When local hunting
clubs rent a district over longer time horizons with the perspective, that the
restraint in hunting today and investing in habitat quality will add to the asset
value of their hunting district, the huntable game population will increase over
time. This incentive can only materialize when local hunters can be sure that
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the hunting regime will not be changed again in the immediate future. In the
vast majority of cases, the hunting district will be given to the previous local
hunting club by the municipality, with individual hunters entering or leaving the
club. This paper argues, that the typical local hunting club under the DBR has
an infinite time horizon of using its local district as long as the macro-political
environment is stable. Therefore, it is in order to take the final adoption of the
DBR on the cantonal level as the starting point for these long run incentive to kick
in and to measure it’s effect on game populations accordingly.
It is in order to point out the minuscule size of Swiss cantons for which the
hunting regimes differ. Whereas Hunting legislation in the USA or Germany
may also vary across states, these political entities are much larger in size. With
41,284 square kilometers, all of Switzerland is about the size of New Hampshire
and Vermont combined, about a tenth of the size of Califoria, or between the size
of the German states of Baden-Würtemberg and Niedersachsen. The geograph-
ical, cultural and ecological proximity of the two different hunting regimes in
Switzerland make it more likely that time-varying unobserved factors, such as
e.g. regional weather-phenomena in a given year or the suitability of the local
habitat for Roe Deer, the disease environment, predator-prey relations, compet-
ing species dynamics, developments in the legal framework of federal hunting
laws, changes in the quality of legal institutions and law enforcement are fairly
homogeneous. And even if there remain some time-varying unobservables, they
are likely to be less problematic in the case of the given data for Switzerland,
compared to studies that can be undertaken for much larger entities or for entities
that are distributed across the globe as is the case with the above-cited fisheries
studies.
4.3 Methodology
Theory on optimal use of renewable resources predicts that users will have a
higher incentive to balance the current harvest value against the future asset value
of the resource, when the institutional environment changes from an open-access
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regime towards a common-property regime.21 In the case of a canton switching
from LBR to DBR, we expect the local hunters who rent the district will at first
restrain themselves in their hunting activities and undertake other measures to
increase the stock of huntable game in their district. They will be much less
concerned, that an outside hunter will come and harvest animals that they have
spared, because this is legally and effectively excluded under the provisions of the
DBR, but legal under the LBR. Furthermore, if Ostrom (1990) is right, all remaining
conflicts inside the local hunting community that are detrimental to the efficient
management of the game population will much more likely be solved by a small,
local community under the DBR than by the much larger hunting community of
the canton. After several years, when the population has increased, it is expected
that the hunters in that district will be able to harvest a much higher sustainable
yield. This effect of the DBR on the population dynamics of Roe Deer is expected
to materialize with a time-lag over the course of several decades.
The objective of this paper is to capture the yearly increases in the HD after
the introduction of the DBR. The treated cantons are Luzern and St. Gallen.
These are the two cantons that switched from the LBR to the DBR in the period
of observation from 1933-2007. The treatment will be captured by the dummy
∆cy which assumes the value of 1 for observations in Luzern after 1941 and in St.
Gallen after 1950 and 0 for all others (see Equation 4.1).
Alternatively, and to reveal how the treatment effect materializes over time, the
treatment will be captured by a year counter δcy, which accounts for the duration
of the treatment in years after introduction for the Cantons of Luzern and St.
Gallen. The specification in Equation 4.2) accounts for a linear time trend after
introduction of the DBR.
To allow for more flexibility in the evolution of the effect after the institutional
change, specifications with polynomial terms up to the 6th degree were tested.
The control group is given by all Cantons that have either adopted the DBR before
1933 (Aargau, Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, Thurgau,
Zurich) or have not adopted the DBR (the remainder of the Cantons except for
21For a textbook exposition see e.g. Tietenberg and Lewis (2012, p. 327-332).
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Geneva and Ticino which were excluded from the sample).22 The baseline spe-
cification includes polynomials up to the 4th degree (see Equation 4.3).
HDcy = τc + θy + β1.1∆cy + ǫcy (4.1)
HDcy = τc + θy + β2.1δcy + ǫcy (4.2)






cy + ǫcy (4.3)
All these specifications include cantonal fixed effects τi and a full set of yearly
time fixed effects θy. This is a flexible way to control for a host of unobserved
characteristics: The cantonal fixed effects control for any unobserved character-
istics of the canton that stay constant over time. This could be, for example, the
remaining time-invariant difference in suitability of the canton as a habitat for
Roe Deer. Bear in mind, that HDcy of harvested Roe Deer per 100 ha of forest is
determined relative to the time-variant measure of forested lands in the canton.
Moreover, the standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.23
The yearly time fixed effects control for unobserved characteristics that have
affected the included cantons in a similar way. For example, the impact of weather
conditions on hunting success in a given year, or climate change, or the impact
of a harsh or mild winter on the stock of game populations, the general rise of
HDs in the aggregate, changes in agriculture, changes in the disease environment,
predator-prey relations, development of competing species, etc. The proximity
of different hunting regimes in the case of Switzerland make it more likely, that
unobserved trends will have affected the cantons in similar ways.
For robustness checks, we exclude cantons that are not adjacent to DBR cantons
22As a robustness test, evidence will be presented for an alternative specification in which all
cantons are included as treated that have switched to the DBR in the 20th century: Schaffhausen,
Solothurn, Thurgau and Zurich, which have adopted the DBR in 1921, 1932, 1930 and 1921. The
control group includes the DBR cantons of Aargau (1838), Basel-Landschaft (1832) and Basel-Stadt
(1877), which had permanently adopted the DBR more than 50 years before observations start in
1933, and the remainder of the cantons without Geneva and Ticino (See Section 4.2).
23One reason for clustering at the cantonal level is that cantonal data may be of different quality
(particularly for observations at the beginning of observations), with cantons possibly adopting
different methods in compiling the data or exerting different levels of effort in providing accurate
and realistic numbers.
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or for which Roe Deer is not the numerically most important big game animal.
For those concerned, that the alpine characteristics of some of the LBR cantons
drive the results, note that the baseline specification only includes the two alpine
DBR cantons of Luzern and St. Gallen as treated.
Furthermore, note that the choice of adopting the DBR was not driven by
social or conservational concerns, but primarily driven by financial needs in the
aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression which hit Swiss cantons as
a whole at the same time24. The financial needs of this era hit all cantons at the
same time and had triggered similar political processes in both adopting and non-
adopting cantons. The Cantons of Bern, Fribourg and Schwyz held popular votes
in most of the others there were private or govermental initiatives to introduce
the DBR. As the DBR was favored mainly by the more affluent hunters, whereas
the median voter objected to privileges for the rich and wanted to keep hunting
more affordable, the efforts to introduce the DBR were frequently delayed or failed
altogether (Schmidt, 1976, p. 128-158).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Baseline Results
How do the yearly HDs of Luzern (DBR in 1941) and St. Gallen (DBR in 1950)
compare to neighboring cantons before and after introduction of the DBR? Eye-
balling the HD time series for Luzern in Figure 4.6 and for St. Gallen in Figure 4.7
provides a first impression that is in line with the theoretical predictions. It looks
as if Luzern and St. Gallen approach the HD levels of their DBR neighbors over
the course of several decades after transition to the DBR. Furthermore, Luzern’s
and St. Gallen’s HD experience a steeper increase in absolute terms over the
period of observation compared to their neighbors who adopted the DBR earlier
or not at all.
24Most clearly this is stated by Schmidt: “Die Entscheidung der Kantone zu einem der beiden
Jagdsysteme fiel zu keiner Zeit und in keinem Kanton nach sozialen und nur zum Teil nach wild-
schützerischen Gesichtspunkten, sondern ausschliesslich nach finanziellen. (...) Die Entscheidun-
gen in den Kantonen über das Jagdsystem gingen nicht von der Sorge um den Wildstand aus, wennschon
davon die Rede war”(1976, p.128, emphasized as in the source).
81
Figure 4.6: Luzern catches up with Aargau
The next step is to present econometric evidence along what was outlined in
Section 4.3. In Table 4.2 you find the baseline results of this paper. The model
in the first column estimates the coefficient for a dummy that equals one for all
observations for Luzern and St. Gallen after their respective introduction of the
DBR. Thus, this dummy can be thought of as the average increase in HD for
Luzern and St. Gallen after the treatment. The number of Roe Deer harvested per
100 ha of forest increases by 2 over the period of observation.
A second model with a linear trend is estimated to account for the average
yearly increase over time. This estimate indicates an increase of the HD by ca. 4
Roe Deer over the course of 50 years. This figure is more or less in line with the
graphical evidence from Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.
However, economic theory suggests that the eventual rise in HD should occur
in two phases: first, a phase of temporarily restrained harvesting followed by a
phase of permanently increased harvesting, when the stock of huntable game has
increased sufficiently to allow for a higher sustainable yield. In order to capture
such a non-linear effect, specifications with polynomials up to the 6th degree have
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Figure 4.7: St. Gallen catches up with neighboring DBR Cantons
been tested. For the baseline results presented here, the non-linearities were best
captured by a fourth degree polynomial. The results are presented in the third
column.25
In order to better interpret the estimation results from the fourth order poly-
nomial refer to the graph in Figure 4.8. Note, that the evidence from the third
column of the baseline results suggests that HDs decline at first and then after five
to ten years rise over time until they plateau after around 40 years. After 50 years
HDs increase again more steeply. Given that these results estimate the treatment
effect of switching to the DBR for the Cantons Luzern and St. Gallen, take note,
that these cantons are observed only for roughly 60 years after the introduction.
When reaching the plateau between 40 and 50 years after introduction, the in-
crease amounts to 3-4 Roe Deer per 100 ha of forested land. This result is roughly
consistent with the estimate for the linear trend in the second model of Table
4.2. Moreover, it is consistent with what would be expected from the economic
25The F-statistic for joint significance of the four polynomial terms amounts to 74.19 and the
null can be rejected at all conventional levels of significance.
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4th Order Term 0.00000278∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 1692 1692 1692
p-values in parentheses
with cantonal FEs and full set of yearly TDs, SEs clustered for cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
theory of renewable resources if the resource was depleted under the LBR and
then recovers under the DBR.
These results are in line with theory-based expectations and they are statistic-
ally significant - but what about the size of the effect? Some back-of-the-envelope
considerations based on the Federal Hunting Statistics and the Area Statistics of
Zurich: a medium-sized hunting district has around 400 ha of huntable land,
which includes both forested and agricultural land. With 171 districts and 50’300
ha of forest, a typical hunting district in Zurich would harvest ca. 30 Roe Deer
per year on ca. 300 ha of forested land in the period of 2000-2007. If the Canton of
Zurich had - hypothetically - not changed to the DBR, we would expect that 9-12
Roe Deer less would be harvested per district. This is a sizeable effect amounting
to roughly a third of the annual hunting bag. For the Canton of Zurich, the provi-
sions for auctioning the districts dictate that no more than CHF 300 per Roe Deer
harvested should be charged as rent and the hunting laws dictate that in case of
poaching the value of an adult Roe Deer will have to be compensated by CHF
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Figure 4.8: Baseline Results
Y-Axis: increase in HD of Roe Deer per 100 ha, X-Axis: timeline
in years.
200.26 Consequently, an estimate of the increase in monetary terms would amount
to CHF 1800-3600 per district and to ca. CHF 300’000-600’000 for the canton. The
average Zurich hunter harvested ca. 2.5 Roe Deer per year, his annual bag would
be reduced by a third without the DBR or 545 of the 1634 Zurich hunters would
have to quit hunting to keep the annual bag per hunter at the current level (figures
for 2007).
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
For the first set of robustness checks refer to Table 4.3. The specification of the
econometric model is identical to the first, but here the cantons that do not share
a common border with a DBR canton are excluded from the previous sample,
namely Fribourg, Neuchâtel, Uri, Valais and Vaud. For the specifications in
column 1 and 2, the results are equivalent. For the specification in column 3, the
levels of statistical significance drop, but the graph in Figure 4.9 exhibits the same
26Refer to www.aln.zh.ch/internet/baudirektion/aln/de/fjv/Jagd.html for the provisions
on auctioning and links to the cantonal hunting regulations.
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characteristics as in the baseline specification.27 These results alleviate concerns
that the results might be driven by a comparison that includes cantons that are
too different from the treated group with regard to, for example, geographical or
climatic characteristics.










4th Order Term 0.00000240∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 1336 1336 1336
p-values in parentheses
with cantonal FEs and full set of yearly TDs, SEs clustered for cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
For the second set of robustness checks refer to Table 4.4. The specification
of the econometric models is again identical to the first, but here the cantons
for which Roe Deer is not the numerically most important game species are
excluded from the control group. As pointed out already in Section 4.2, Roe Deer is
numerically more important than Red Deer in all cantons except for Graubünden
and Valais, and numerically more important than Chamois in all cantons except
for Glarus, Graubünden, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Uri and Valais. Therefore, these
cantons are excluded from the control group here. For the specifications in column
1 and 2, the results are again equivalent. Regarding the specification in column
3, the graph in Figure 4.10 exhibits the same characteristics as in the baseline
27The F-statistic for joint significance of the four polynomial terms amounts to 52.78 and the
null can be rejected at all conventional levels of significance.
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Figure 4.9: Without non-neighboring Cantons
Y-Axis: increase in HD of Roe Deer per 100 ha, X-Axis: timeline
in years.
specification.28 It is conceivable, for example, that an increase in Red Deer in the
control cantons had led to a crowding out of Roe Deer and thus driven the results.
These results alleviate concerns that the results might be driven by a comparison
that includes cantons where other big game species like Red Deer and Chamois
are more important to the ecosystem and the cantonal hunting communities.
For the third set of robustness checks refer to Table 4.5. The specification of
the econometric models is again similar to the baseline specification (a fifth order
polynomial term is added for better fit), but note an important difference: the years
after adoption of the DBR are not only counted and included in the estimation
of the polynomial terms for Luzern and St. Gallen, but for all cantons that have
switched from the LBR to the DBR in the 20th century. Now Schaffhausen (DBR
in 1921), Solothurn (DBR in 1932), Thurgau (DBR in 1930) and Zurich (DBR in
1929) are included in the treatment group.
Note that these cantons have made the institutional transitions before we start
observing the data in 1933. Therefore, the estimation of the DBR Dummy is essen-
28The F-statistic for joint significance of the four polynomial terms amounts to 36.78 and the
null can be rejected at all conventional levels of significance.
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4th Order Term 0.00000240∗∗
(0.002)
N 1189 1189 1189
p-values in parentheses
with cantonal FEs and full set of yearly TDs, SEs clustered for cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
tially the same as testing it for the baseline specification, as the DBR characteristic
for the early adopters is picked up by the cantonal fixed effect. Moreover, column 2
shows that the linear trend for the treated group is not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels of significance. As for the other results, polynomials
up to the 6th degree were estimated to allow for different kinds of non-linearities.
In the third column the results are presented for a 4th order polynomial29, for
which you find a graph in black in Figure 4.11. In the fourth column you find the
results for a 5th order polynomial30, the corresponding graph is blue in Figure
4.11. The graph for the 5th order polynomial exhibits slightly different dynamics
compared to the previously presented 4th order polynomials. Still, they share the
qualitative characteristics that were predicted by the theory: HDs of Roe Deer rise
with a time lag after the introduction of the DBR. Over the course of 50 years, for
the 5th order polynomial the results are again in the ballpark of what the previous
29The F-statistic for joint significance of the four polynomial terms amounts to 1.95 and the null
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance (corresponding p-Value:0.1365).
30The F-statistic for joint significance of the four polynomial terms amounts to 5.71 and the null
can be rejected at all conventional levels of significance (corresponding p-Value: 0.0024).
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Figure 4.10: Without Cantons where Roe Deer is not the most important Big Game
Y-Axis: increase in HD of Roe Deer per 100 ha, X-Axis: timeline
in years.
specifications had suggested: per 100ha of forested land, the HD of Roe Deer
increases by 3-4 over a period of 50 years, for the 4th order polynomial the results
are about a third smaller. One possible explanation for the shifting functional
form could be given by the data structure: For the early years of treatment we
still have very few observations, for the first year only St. Gallen and Luzern, but
from the thirteenth year onwards, the number of cantons has risen to six and the
estimator attributes weight to fitting these observations accordingly, giving more
weight to a fit for the later treatment years. Moreover, right after the introduction
of the Federal Hunting Statistic in 1933, data is still missing for some cantons and
the data quality is probably relatively poor compared to later periods.31
4.5 Conclusion
This paper finds that the introduction of the DBR has had a positive effect on
Roe Deer densities compared to the LBR. This finding is in line with theoretical
31If, for example, the incidence of missing observations can be taken as an indicator for poor data
quality and heterogeneity in measurement efforts among cantonal authorities at the beginning of
the period of observations.
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Table 4.5: All 20th Century DBR Cantons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DBR Dummy 2.200∗∗
(0.002)
Linear Term 0.0242 0.0711 0.381∗∗
(0.190) (0.339) (0.002)
Quadratic Term 0.000563 -0.0292∗
(0.851) (0.019)
Cubic Term -0.0000300 0.000980∗
(0.583) (0.024)
4th Order Term 0.000000188 -0.0000139∗
(0.571) (0.026)
5th Order Term 6.91e-08∗
(0.027)
N 1695 1695 1695 1695
p-values in parentheses
with Cantonal FEs and full set of yearly TDs, SEs clustered for cantons
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 4.11: Fourth and Fifth Order Polynomial with all 20th Century DBR Can-
tons
Y-Axis: increase in HD of Roe Deer per 100 ha, X-Axis: timeline
in years.
Black: fourth order polynomial, Blue: fifth order polynomial
predictions from the institutional economics of renewable resources, which hold
that the institution of private or common property gives incentives to the owners
of the resource to use it such that the harvest in the current period is balanced
against the increases in the asset value of the resource that materialize, if the stock
of the resource grows. As such, this finding is closely related to the empirical lit-
erature on institutions of fisheries management. These results are commensurate
with the interpretation, that giving ownership to individuals or groups under the
DBR provides effective incentives to preserve a renewable resource in the long
run.
As for possible extensions of this research project, a natural question to ask
would be: what about the other big game species? The choice of Roe Deer as
an indicator species that may exhibit such population dynamics after treatment
was, among other reasons, justified by the small homeranges, that typically lie
within a hunting district in a Swiss DBR canton. For other species, like Red Deer,
Chamois and Wild Boar, that have larger home ranges and are more mobile, the
effects of these two hunting institutions has not yet been examined. Preliminary
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explorations, that are not presented here, have not shown equivalent results.
Another obvious extension of this work would be to examine at a more detailed
level how more specific hunting regulations differ in Swiss cantons with respect
to certain game species and to explore the effects, wherever data is available, also
at lower levels of aggregation.
Note, that in the case of game populations a higher stock is not necessarily
better from a social welfare perspective: increased game populations can also
lead to higher damages in agriculture and forestry. Therefore, such an increase
in the stock of game must not be beneficial in the aggregate. Roe Deer, Red
Deer and Wild Boar are notorious among farmers and foresters for their negative
externalities. Therefore, this paper does not advocate the adoption of either the
DBR or the LBR, but highlights how these two fundamentally different hunting
institutions have led to large differences in population stocks per 100 ha of forested
land depending on the choice of the regime for Roe Deer.
Thus, this project provides statistical evidence for the effective difference
between the two institutions. A policy recommendation based on this evidence
could be to adopt DBR-style regulations for species that should be preserved or
even increased and to adopt LBR-style regulations for species for which the popu-
lation growth should be held in check or for which a reduction in the stock would
be favorable to social welfare. From the perspective of the hunting community,
the DBR exhibits a clear advantage over the LBR with respect to a game species
like Roe Deer in 20th century Switzerland, because the larger stock allows for a
higher sustainable yield of harvested Roe Deer.32
32It is in order to point out, that cantonal DBR-regulations prescribe that the local hunters




Appendix to “Long Run Effect of
French Annexation on 19th Century
Switzerland”
A.1 Quotation from Friedrich Engels’ ”Die deutsche
Reichsverfassungskampagne”
Rheinpreußen hat seit 1815 als eine der fortgeschrittensten Provin-
zen Deutschlands gegolten, und mit Recht. Es vereinigt zwei Vorzüge,
die sich in keinem andern Teil Deutschlands vereinigt finden.
Rheinpreußen teilt mit Luxemburg, Rheinhessen und der Pfalz den
Vorteil, seit 1795 die Französische Revolution und die gesellschaft-
liche, administrative und legislative Konsolidierung ihrer Resultate
unter Napoleon mitgemacht zu haben. Als die revolutionäre Partei in
Paris erlag, trugen die Armeen die Revolution über die Grenzen. Vor
diesen kaum befreiten Bauernsöhnen zerstoben nicht nur die Armeen
des Heiligen Römischen Reichs, sondern auch die Feudalherrschaft
des Adels und der Pfaffen. Seit zwei Generationen kennt das linke
Rheinufer keinen Feudalismus mehr; der Adlige ist seiner Privilegien
beraubt, der Grundbesitz ist aus seinen Händen und denen der Kirche
in die Hände des Bauern übergegangen; der Boden ist parzelliert,
der Bauer ist freier Grundbesitzer wie in Frankreich. In den Städten
verschwanden die Zünfte und die patriarchalische Patrizierherrschaft
zehn Jahre früher als irgendwo in Deutschland vor der freien Konkur-
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renz, und der Code Napoléon sanktionierte schließlich den ganzen
veränderten Zustand in der Zusammenfassung der gesamten revolu-
tionären Institutionen.
Rheinpreußen besitzt aber zweitens - und darin liegt sein Hauptvorzug
vor den übrigen Ländern des linken Rheinufers - die ausgebildetste
und mannigfachste Industrie von ganz Deutschland. In den drei Re-
gierungsbezirken Aachen, Köln und Düsseldorf sind fast alle Indus-
triezweige vertreten: Baumwollen-, Wollen- und Seidenindustrie aller
Art nebst den davon abhängigen Branchen der Bleicherei, Druckerei
und Färberei, der Eisengießerei und Maschinenfabrikation, ferner Ber-
gbau, Waffenschmieden und sonstige Metallindustrie finden sich hier
auf dem Raum weniger Quadratmeilen konzentriert und beschäfti-
gen eine Bevölkerung von in Deutschland unerhörter Dichtigkeit. An
die Rheinprovinz schließt sich unmittelbar, sie mit einem Teil der
Rohstoffe versorgend und industriell zu ihr gehörend, der märkische
Eisen-und Kohlendistrikt an. Die beste Wasserstraße Deutschlands,
die Nähe des Meeres, der mineralische Reichtum der Gegend begünsti-
gen die Industrie, die außerdem zahlreiche Eisenbahnen erzeugt hat
und ihr Eisenbahnnetz noch täglich vervollständigt. Mit der Indus-
trie in Wechselwirkung steht ein für Deutschland sehr ausgedehnter
Ausfuhr- und Einfuhrhandel nach allen Weltteilen, ein bedeutender
direkter Verkehr mit allen großen Stapelplätzen des Weltmarkts und
eine verhältnismäßige Spekulation in Rohprodukten und Eisenbahnak-
tien. Kurz, die industrielle und kommerzielle Entwicklungsstufe der
Rheinprovinz ist, wenn auch auf dem Weltmarkt ziemlich unbedeu-
tend, doch für Deutschland einzig.
Die Folge dieser - ebenfalls unter der revolutionären französis-
chen Herrschaft aufgeblühten - Industrie und des mit ihr zusam-
menhängenden Handels in Rheinpreußen ist die Erzeugung einer
mächtigen industriellen und kommerziellen großen Bourgeoisie und,
im Gegensatz zu ihr, eines zahlreichen industriellen Proletariats, zweier
Klassen, die im übrigen Deutschland nur sehr stellenweise und em-
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bryonisch existieren, die aber die besondre politische Entwicklung der
Rheinprovinz fast ausschließlich beherrschen.
Source: (Engels and Marx, 1960, p. 115-117)
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treffend die eidgenössische polytechnische Schule (vom 12. Januar 1859). Sch-
weizerisches Bundesblatt, 1 (4), 67–84.
— (1863). Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die Bundesversammlung, betreffend
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Festgabe zur Jahrhundertfeier. Zürich: Verlag der Erziehungsdirektion.
Fritzsche, B. (1996). Switzerland, Cambridge University Press, pp. 126–148.
— (2001). Historischer Strukturatlas der Schweiz: die Entstehung der modernen Schweiz.
Hier + Jetzt.
Gordon, H. S. (1954). The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy, 62 (2), pp. 124–142.
Grab, A. (2003). Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe. European History in
Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan.
Gugerli, D. (2004). Professoren-Datenbank ETH. unpublished raw data, entries
accessable on www.ethistory.ethz (ETHistory ProfDB.fp7, last update
31.12.2004).
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
98
Heckman, J. J. and Urzua, S. (2009). Comparing IV With Structural Models: What
Simple IV Can and Cannot Identify. Working Paper 14706, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Hentschel, V. (1975). Die deutschen Freihändler und der volkswirtschaftliche Kongreß
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